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Statement of Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code section 78-2(a)3(j), as this case was poured over from the Utah Supreme Court. See Utah Code Ann. §
78-2(a)-3(j).
Issues Presented For Review
1.

Did the district court correctly interpret and apply the parties' prenuptial

agreement? Prenuptial agreements are "construed and treated as ... contracts in general."
Berman v. Berman, 749 P.2d 1271, 1273 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The lower court's
"interpretation of a contract presents a question of law, which we review for correctness."
Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 2003 UT 50, f 16, 84 P.3d 1134.
2.

Did the district court err when it denied Appellant's motion to compel

discovery? "Generally, the trial court is granted broad latitude in handling discovery
matters." R&REnergies v. Mother Earth Industries, Inc., 936 P.2d 1068,1079 (Utah 1997)
(citation omitted). This Court will "not find abuse of discretion absent an erroneous
conclusion of law or where there is no evidentiary basis for the trial court's rulings." Askew
v. Hardman, 918 P.2d 469, 472 (Utah 1996).
3•

Did the district court err when it determined the amount of the alimony award?

District courts have "'considerable discretion in determining alimony... and [determinations
of alimony] will be upheld on appeal unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is
demonstrated.'" Riley v. Riley, 2006 UT App 214, If 15, 138 P.3d 84 (quoting Davis v.
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Davis, 2003 UT App 282, ^ 7, 76 P.3d 716 (alterations in original)).
4.

Did the district court err in regard to its attorney fee determinations? "'The

decision to award attorney fees and the amount thereof rests primarily in the sound discretion
of the trial court.'" Riley, 2006 UT App 214, *h 15 (quoting Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942,
947 (Utah Ct.App.1998). This determination is reviewed for abuse of that discretion. See
Taylor v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 923, 931 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (overruled on other grounds by
Sittner v. Schriever, 2000 UT 45, 2 P.3d 442).
Statement of the Case
Appellant's "Statement of the Facts" is incorrect and ignores the actualfindingsmade
by the district court, which findings have not been properly attacked by Appellant.

To

successfully challenge these findings, Appellant "must marshal the evidence in support of
the findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so
lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence, thus making them clearly
erroneous." Shepherd v. Shepherd, 876 P.2d 429,431 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quotations and
citations omitted). "If the appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the appellate court assumes
that the record supports the findings of the trial court and proceeds to a review of the
accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law and the application of that law in the case."
Id. (quotations and citation omitted).
Because Appellant has made no effort to marshal the evidence or attack the district
court's factual findings, the facts of this case are as set forth in the district court's Findings
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of Fact and Conclusions of Law, R. 2347-2396, a copy of which is attached hereto as
Addendum Ex. 1 and incorporated herein by this reference.1
Summary of Arguments
Appellant cannot show any error committed by the district court when it
interpreted and applied the prenuptial agreement. The terms of that agreement are clear and
consistent with the district court's interpretation and application thereof.
Appellant is unable to show any abuse of discretion relating to the district court's
discovery ruling; to the contrary, because the information sought by Appellant was irrelevant,
the district court's denial of such discovery was correct.
Last, Appellant fails to show any abuse of discretion relating to the district court's
alimony award or its determinations relating to attorney fees. Appellant's argument that her
version of the facts should have been accepted by the district court is insufficient on appeal,
and Appellant offers no legal basis for her argument that the attorney fee awards were
improper.
Accordingly, the district court's ruling should be affirmed. In addition, Appellee
should be awarded his attorney fees incurred on appeal.
Argument
L

Appellant Fails to Show Any Error Committed by the District
Court in its Construction and Application of the Prenuptial
Agreement.

lr

The district court clarified and modified certain factual findings in a Ruling dated
October 12, 2007, which Ruling is attached hereto as Addendum Ex. 2.
6

Appellant alleges that the district court erred as a matter of law in its construction of
the prenuptial agreement (a copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum Ex. 4).
Specifically, Appellant argues that the court erred when it failed to construe this agreement
in her favor. This argument is without merit.
Utah courts have "explicitly acknowledged the general authority of spouses or
prospective spouses to arrange property rights by a contract that is recognized and enforced
by a court in the event of a divorce." Reese v. Reese, 1999 UT 75, \ 24,984 P.2d 987. "Such
agreements are 'construed and treated as...contracts in general.'" Shepherd, 876 P.2d at 431
(quotingBerman v. Berman, 749P.2d 1271,1273 (Utah App. 1988). "Therefore, the first step
in interpreting a prenuptial agreement is to look 'to the four corners of the agreement to
determine the intention of the parties.'" Id. (quoting Neilson v. Neilson,! 80 ?.2d 1264,1267
(Utah Ct. App. 1989)).
Prenuptial agreements "'are valid so long as there is no fraud, coercion, or material
nondisclosure.'" Shepherd, 876P.2d at 431 (quoting Buck v. Huck, 734P.2d417,419 (Utah
1986); see also Matter of Estate of Beesley, 883 P.2d 1343 (Utah 1994) ("premarital
agreements are valid provided there is no material nondisclosure in connection with their
negotiation and execution."). As described by the Utah Supreme Court:
[T]he general principle derived from our case law is that
spouses or prospective spouses may make binding contracts with
each other and arrange their affairs as they see fit, insofar as the
negotiations are conducted in good faith...and do not
unreasonably constrain the court's equitable and statutory duties.
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Reese, 1999 UT 75, f 25 (citations omitted).
The district court followed these guidelines and determined that the prenuptial
agreement was valid, enforceable and binding on the parties. See Ruling on Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment (R. 1029-34); see also Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
p.3, Tf 8 (R. 2349) ("the evidence presented at trial reinforces the Court's determination that
the Agreement is valid and enforceable"). The court specifically held that, at the time of the
execution of this aigreement, both parties "were represented by capable counsel in negotiating
the prenuptial agreement and there were negotiations back and forth that resulted in a final
agreement that reflected input from both [parties]." Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, p.3, *H 9.
Appellant does not challenge the district court's findings, nor its conclusion that the
prenuptial agreement was "valid and enforceable." Instead, Appellant argues
In this case, the trial court made no findings, and
apparently gave no consideration whatsoever, to whether the
ultimate outcome it imposed was just, fair and equitable to both
panies.
Appellant's Brief, p. 31. This assertion is without any legal basis; a district court's failure
to interpret a prenuptial agreement in Appellant's favor is not a ground for reversal.
As set forth above, the general rule is that prenuptial agreements are valid as long as
"there is no fraud, coercion, or material nondisclosure.'" Shepherd, 876 P.2d at 431; see also
Reese, 1999 UT 75, f 25. There is no argument by Appellant that any of these exceptions
apply. Instead, Appellant offers the unique argument that, because a district court may have
8

some discretion to modify prenuptial agreements, a district court's decision not to exercise
that discretion creates a ground for reversal as a matter of law; in other words, the argument
seems to be that the failure to exercise discretion constitutes an abuse of that discretion. This
argument is unsupported, defies common sense, would eviscerate the general rule set forth
in Reese, 1999 UT 75, f 25, and would nullify the right of parties to arrange their property
division through contract. See id., \ 24. There is simply no requirement that a district court,
after determining the validity of a prenuptial agreement, conduct an additional and
independent factual inquiry as to the fairness of that document. Indeed, it is presumably the
analysis set forth in Shepherd, 876 P.2d at 431, that answers this question. In any event, even
if one gives this unsupported argument the benefit of the doubt, Appellant fails to set forth
any facts of record that could show that such an inquiry would produce a different result. See
Mule-Hide Products Co., Inc. v. White, 2002 UT App 1, f 12, 40 P.3d 1155 ("Even where
error is found, reversal is appropriate only in those cases where, after review of all the
evidence presented at trial, it appears that absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood
that a different result would have been reached." (quotations and citation omitted)).
Accordingly, Appellant has failed to provide a ground for reversal.
II.

Appellant Fails to Establish Error by the District Court When
it Interpreted "Earnings" Under the Prenuptial Agreement.

Appellant argues that the district court erred when it determined there were no
"earnings" to divide between the parties under the prenuptial agreement. Appellant
9

does not attack the district court's findings on this matter, but merely reargues its
unsuccessful position that "earnings" should be interpreted extremely broadly. This
argument is insufficient to substantiate district court error.
The district court's determinations regarding "earnings" under the prenuptial
agreement were predicated on numerous findings, including the following:
36.
The Agreement, paragraphs D and F. 1
reverses the presumption under California law that any income
resulting from the efforts of a husband or wife during marriage,
and any property acquired with that income, is community
property. Instead, all income, and all property acquired with that
income, is separate property unless the Agreement provides
otherwise.
3 7.
Subparagraph D. 1 of the Agreement provides
that earnings are governed by paragraph F. Subparagraph F.l of
the Agreement provides that earnings from personal services,
skills, efforts, talents, or work are separate property, except as
the Agreement specifically provides. Subparagraph F.2 of the
Agreement creates a community property right in the "earnings"
or "base salary" derived from actual effort or employment of
Robert. Earnings or base salary are defined as compensation for
labor or services performed by Robert, but do not include any
benefits associated with such earnings or base salary.
38. The only earnings or base salary derived from
actual efforts of Robert were paid to him during the first four
months following the marriage and were promptly consumed on
community expenses, thus leaving no community property.
39.
Subparagraph F.3 of the Agreement provides
that: In the event [Robert] enters into any type of business
venture or ventures from and after the date of marriage from
which [Robert] will receive earnings or salary therefrom
(regardless of whether such earnings or salary have been derived
from actual effort or services performed by [Robert] for or on
10

behalf of the business venture), such earnings or salary, derived
from such business venture or ventures, shall be community
property. For purposes of this paragraph f.3, the term
"earnings" or "salary" derived from said business venture or
ventures excludes pension and deferred income contributions,
stock, stock options, bonuses, benefits and rights and
perquisites, which items shall remain | Robert's] separate
property subject to Paragraphs F.5, F.6, and b .7. It is the parties
intention that all property acquired with such "earnings" or
"salary" (defined under this Paragraph F.3) shall be community
property unless the parties agree otherwise in writing
40.
The parties dispute the meaning of the term
"earnings" as used in h i Robert maintains that the inclusion
of the phrase "whether such earnings or salary ha\e been
derived from actual effort or services performed by Robert for
or on behalf of the business venture" simply loosens the
requirement that Robert actually perform services for his
business venture to make his earnings or salary community
property and the term "earnings" still lias the customary
meaning under California law. California law defines earnings
as salary or wages of a person received because of services
provided. Hope maintains that the term "earnings" as used in
F.3 includes any and all profits allocated to Robert from [Flat
Iron Mesa and the Resort]
41
This Court is required to read the Agreement as
w hole in order to determine the meaning and intent of the parties
and In harmonize its various provisions.
Therefore,
Subparagraph F.3 must be interpreted in light of the It J lowing
precisions of the Agreement:
a.

Subparagraph F .4 which defines Kellwood
payments, except salar), as ,i'porate
property.

b.

Sul | in i mi 11 ill I
i* III In creates a
mffffiiiinih
pmperts iM'hl in bonuses
K..i
1 1 ) Robert as a11 1111 loyee under
limited circumstances, t h e Court finds
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that none of these limited circumstances
apply.
Subparagraph F.6 which provides an
additional community property right in
bonuses based on the duration of the
marriage. The Court finds that there were
no bonuses paid to Robert that would
invoke this subparagraph.
Subparagraph F.7 which provides a
community property right in pension
payments based on longevity of the
marriage. The Court finds that Robert has
not received any pension payments.
Subparagraph F. 8 excludes any community
property participation in stock options or
dividends.
Subparagraph F.9 which provides that
earnings or salary from joint business
ventures are community property, but joint
business ventures must be established by
written agreement. The Court finds that
there were no joint business ventures.
Paragraph I of the Agreement provides
that all profits, rents, increase, appreciation
and income from Robert's separate
property are also his property. A change in
the form of Robert's separate property
does not change the characterization of
that property. If Robert sells separate
property and purchases other property, that
new property is also Robert's separate
property.
Paragraph J of the Agreement provides
that devoting time, skill or effort to
12

separate property does not ehanne it to
community property.
42.
The Cowl finds that Hope's .inserted meaning
ol tin term "earnings" as used in subparagraph h i to mean any
kind of profit from any business venture lo be untenable. The
Court accepts Robert's interpretation as valid under California
law and finds that the terms "earnings" means payments based
at least in theory on services, such as actual salary, guaranteed
payments to a member in a limited liability company, or draws
to a partner in an operating business partnership. Any other
interpretation would be in conflict with the remainder of the
Agreement and render it superfluous. The Court finds it hard to
believe that Robert went to the trouble of obtaining such a
comprehensive and detailed prenuptial agreement so that he
could ensure that Hope could claim one-half of the profits from
any business venture in which he would become involved.
43.
Hope also attempted to persuade the Court that
Robert was actively engaged in the management of Flat Iron
Mesa. The Court rejects this argument and finds that Robert had
virtually no active involvement in Flat Iron \h was a passive
investor. Even if the Court were to adopl I Inpe's argument
however, there would still not be any earnings as contemplated
by the Agreement because it was Robert's capital investment,
not his business efforts, that resulted in profits from Flat Iron.
44.
The Court finds that Robert did not receive an)
earnings or salary from the Resort oi I I at Iron Mesa as
contemplated by the Agreement and there is no community
property.
45.
Although the Court finds that the Agreement in
unambiguous and can be interpreted as a matter of law, even if
the Court were to consider parol evidence, its interpretation of
the term "earnings" would be the same. Robert testified that he
always intended that Hope would only participate in his base
salary and then in bonuses and pension payments in the limited
circumstances set forth above. Robert specifically remembers
discussing the contents of F.3 and understanding it to mean that
13

Hope would only participate in his wages, salary, or other
similar payments resulting from any new active business he may
start. Robert's interpretation of the term "earnings" is consistent
with the overall expressed purpose of the Agreement. Hope had
virtually no recollection of the specific provisions of the
Agreement even though her attorney discussed the terms of the
Agreement with her on numerous occasions. Hope's description
of what she understood the Agreement to mean was general and
did not appear to be based on any actual memory of the
language of the Agreement or advice of her counsel.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,fflf36-45, pp. 11-17 (R.2358-2363). The district
court also gave a detailed explanation for its ruling in its September 14,2007 Memorandum
Decision, pp. 11 -19 (R.2239-47) (attached hereto as Addendum Ex. 3). Appellant makes no
effort to challenge the district court's findings, and this Court may therefore assume that the
record supports such findings. See Shepherd v. Shepherd, 876 P.2d at 431; Saunders v.
Sharp, 806 P.2d at 199; Matter of Estate ofBeesley, 883 P.2d at 1349.
Instead, Appellant re-argues that the term "earnings" should be read extremely
broadly, so that it encompasses any increase in Appellee's separate property. This argument
is once again without basis. The prenuptial agreement defines earnings as "compensation
for labor or services performed by Petitioner." Prenuptial agreement, p. 9. Similarly, the
California Supreme Court recently held that the common definition of earnings is "the salary
or wages of a person." Prachasaisoradej v. Ralphs Grocery Co., Inc., 165 P.3d 133, 138
(Cal. 2007) (citing American Heritage Diet., 2d college ed. 1985). Appellant has not taken
a salary or wages in relation to the developments at issue; therefore there are no earnings
under the prenuptial agreement. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Yfl 38-42;.
14

September 14, 2007 Memorandum Decision, p i " .
Appellant gives no explanation as to why the term earnings should In cvpandui
humid iK planum jiiiiii'

lln lin in l rihloiMM ri» 111 Ml,ih i> (li.il premaiital agreements

I
are interpreted according to the ordinary rules of contract construction. See In re Bonds, 5
I
P.3d 815, 24 Cal.4th 1,11 (Cal. 2000); Shepherd, 876 P2d at 4 \\ 1 hesc rules lequire that
a contract be read as a whole in order In dilcriiiinr lln* niramim urinl mluit w\ lln p irfir iml
lo tnniioni/e it1 * .inoti^ piovisions.*See General Precision, Inc. v. hit lAss'n of Machinists,
241 Cal.App.2d 744, 747 (Cal App 1966); Shepherd, 876 P.2d at 431. The intent of the
parties is set forth extensively and repeatedly throughout Hie piumplial ayieeim mil 1

ml

to kfVfi tin p.itliVs" st'parnlr pioptTh separate, including all rents, issues, profits, increase,
appieciation, and income from that separate property. See prenuptial agreement, pg. 19.
To adopt Appellant's interpretation of the prenuptial agreement would m >L on!) k in
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virtually the entire prenuptial agreement superfluous. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, ^f 42 ("The Court finds that Hope's asserted meaning of the term "earnings .. lo be
untenable.
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theor\ on services, such as actual salary.... Any other interpretation would be in conflict with
the remainder of the Agreement and render it superfluous."). The prenuptial agreement is
not ambiguous and Appellant sattenipl In lind aiiihiruilu s U\ discussing i .nlali d word Mind
phhisrs frnni f Ihcai'/eniinif f \> imeotn mvmgrin re Miller,2004 WL 1966062 * 3 (Cal. App.
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2nd. Dist, 2004). The only tenable reading of this section is to interpret it to mean that all
earnings or salary taken by Appellee are to be treated as earnings even if his labor and efforts
did not directly result in the earnings that were taken. Because the district court found that
Appellant has never taken salary or earnings as contemplated by the prenuptial agreement,
there are no "earnings."
Moreover, Appellant's focus on the definition of "earnings" as set forth in the
prenuptial agreement is performed in a vacuum; she supplies this Court with no facts that
could support a different ruling, even if the Court were to accept her definition of "earnings."
Thus, much like in the preceding section, Appellant fails to set forth any facts of record that
could show that a different definition of "earnings" would produce a different result. See
Mule-Hide Products Co., Inc. v. White, 2002 UT App 1, \ 12 40 P.3d 1155 (holding that
"reversal is appropriate only in those cases where, after review of all the evidence presented
at trial, it appears that absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood that a different result
would have been reached.").
Accordingly, Appellant fails to set forth a reason to reverse the district court's
determinations relating to "earnings" as defined by the prenuptial agreement.
III.

Appellant Fails to Show Error in the District Court's
Discovery Ruling.

Appellant appears to assert that the district court erred when it denied Appellant's
motion to compel discovery relating to earnings subsequent to the parties' separation. The
argument is unclear because Appellant fails to reference any particular order from which she
16

appeals. In any event, Appellant fails to show the district court abused its discretion.
"Generally, the trial court is granted broad latitude in handling discovery matters."
R&R Energies v. Mother Earth Industries, Inc., 936 P.2d 1068, 1079 (Utah 1997) (citing
Utah Dep't of Transp. v. Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d 4, 6 (Utah 1995)). This Court will "not find
abuse of discretion absent an erroneous conclusion of law or where there is no evidentiary
basis for the trial court's rulings." Askew v. Hardman, 918 P.2d 469, 472 (Utah 1996). In
Shepherdv. Shepherd, 876 P.2d 429 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), plaintiff argued that the trial court
erred by limiting the trial proceedings solely to the issue of whether the prenuptial agreement
was valid and binding. This Court disagreed, holding:
A trial court has broad discretion to determine the manner
in which proceedings before it are conducted.. We will not
interfere with a trial court's decision to limit proceedings unless
the trial court abused its discretion. In the present case, the trial
court limited testimony, for a period of time, to the question of
the validity and enforceability of the prenuptial agreement.
Since the validity and enforceability of the prenuptial agreement
was a central issue as to how the court would determine the
value and distribution of the marital estate, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in limiting testimony and evidence to that
question.
Id. at 432.
Here, Appellant moved to compel discovery of Appellee's earnings subsequent to the
date of the parties' separation. See Motion to Compel (R. 1308-10). Appellee objected on
the basis that the inquiry was irrelevant because, under California law, "[t]he earnings and
accumulations of a spouse and the minor children living with, or in the custody of, the
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spouse, while living separate and apart from the other spouse, are the separate property of
the spouse." Obj. and Memo, in Opp. to Motion to Compel, p. 3 (quoting Cal.Fam.Code
§771) (R.1410). The district court agreed with Appellee:
The court denies the motion to compel. The court hereby
determines that California law will govern the property
settlement in this case. The court is persuaded that California
law does not allow earnings after a couple stops living together
to be treated as community property. The prenuptial agreement
does not expressly, nor by fair implication of the meaning of any
provision thereof, alter the application of this aspect of
California law. Wife is only entitled to property that derives
from marital earnings. It is therefore appropriate that earnings
and property after December 31, 2005, be off limits to
discovery.
Ruling on Motion to Compel, p. 1 (R.1527).
Appellant makes no mention of this ruling, and fails to describe precisely why she
believes the district court abused its discretion therein. Instead, Appellant simply reasserts
her incorrect legal argument - that, despite the clear language of the governing California
statute, the district court should have allowed discovery as to post-separation earnings.
As Appellee argued below, Section X of the prenuptial agreement provides that it
"shall be subject to and interpreted under the laws of the State of California." See prenuptial
agreement, p. 42. California law provides that the community interest in any earnings ends
on separation. See Cal.Fam.Code §771 ("The earnings and accumulations of a spouse and
the minor children living with, or in the custody of, the spouse, while living separate and
apart from the other spouse, are the separate property of the spouse."). Because the parties
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separated in late 2005, Appellant had no right to discover anything "earned" by Appellee in
2006 or 2007; such information was irrelevant.
Appellant cites anew to In re Marriage of Geraci, 144 Cal.App. 4th 1278 (Cal.App.
2nd. Dist, 2006), to support her argument that post-separation earnings are community
property. In Geraci, the court addressed the "inherent tension" between the rule that a
community property business should be valued as of the date of trial and the rule that a
spouse's earnings after separation are his or her separate property. Id. at 1290 (emphasis
added). The court felt it was inequitable to value a community property business at the date
of trial when the post-separation efforts of one spouse had "greatly increased the community
estate which must then be divided with the other spouse." Id. (citation omitted). The court
held that "because earnings and accumulations following separation are the spouse's
separate property, it follows that the community interest should be valued as of the date of
separation-the cutoff date for the acquisition of community assets." Id. at 1291 (emphasis
added).
This holding undermines Appellant's argument. In Geraci, there was never an issue
as to the categorization of post-separation earnings which are clearly the separate property
of the spouse who earned them. The language that Appellant cites from Geraci relates to the
valuation of a "community property business," not post-separation earnings. Id. at 1290.
Section 2552 has no impact whatsoever on the classification or valuation of post-separation
earnings which are unambiguously defined as separate property pursuant to Section 771. In
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addition, the argument that the phrase "from and after the date of marriage" somehow trumps
California law that post-separation earnings are separate property is without any basis.
These arguments were presented to the district court, which correctly held that, under
the clear California statute, post-separation earnings were irrelevant and therefore not
discoverable. Appellant is unable to show the district court abused its discretion in this
regard.
Appellant makes a second argument, that the district court's ruling was erroneous as
a matter of Utah law since such earnings "bear on the determination of alimony." Appellant
has failed to show where this argument was preserved below. In any event, post-separation
earnings were irrelevant to the district court's alimony determination. "The fundamental
purpose of alimony is to enable the receiving spouse to maintain as nearly as possible the
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage and to prevent the spouse from becoming a
public charge." Bridenbaugh v. Bridenbaugh, 786 P.2d 241, 242 (Utah Ct. App.1990)
(quotations and citation omitted). "In determining whether to award alimony and in setting
the amount, a trial court must consider the needs of the recipient spouse; the earning capacity
of the recipient spouse; the ability of the obligor spouse to provide support; and, the length
of the marriage." Kelley v. Kelley, 2000 UT App 236, f 26, 9 P.3d 171 (quotations and
citations omitted); see also Batty v. Batty, 2006 UT App 506, \ 4, 153 P.3d 827. "If these
factors have been considered, we will not disturb the trial court's alimony award unless such
a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion." Childs v. Childs,
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967 P.2d 942, 946 (Utah Ct. App.1998) (quotations and citations omitted).
Utah Code section 30-3-5(8) provides certain factors a district court shall consider
when making alimony determinations. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8). The district court
specifically analyzed each such factor. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, ^[ 4671, pp. 17-23 (R. 2363-69). The district court determined that "[Appellee] has stipulated to
the Court that he can afford any reasonable alimony award, thus fulfilling the Court's inquiry
into the third factor." Id, f 49.
This finding, which is not challenged on appeal, is dispositive. Where Appellee
concedes that he can and will pay whatever reasonable alimony is awarded, no purpose is
served by requiring him to disclose post-separation earnings. See Bridenbaugh, 786 P.2d at
243 ("Plaintiff...claims the court erred by refusing to allow full discovery of defendant's
current financial condition. We find no merit in this argument, as defendant conceded that
his present income was eight times that at the time of the divorce... No purpose would have
been served by providing any more detailed information.") The purpose of alimony is to
"enable the receiving spouse to maintain as nearly as possible the standard of living enjoyed
during the marriage," id. at 242; the disclosure of Appellee's post-separation earnings adds
nothing to this analysis.
Accordingly, Appellant shows no error committed by the district court.
IV. and V.

Appellant's Arguments Relating to Standard of Living
Expenses and Alimony Adjustment Fail Due to Failure to
Challenge the Underlying Factual Findings.
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Appellant argues in sections IV and V of her brief that the district court erred when
it determined the amount of the alimony award, urging in each case that her version of the
facts should have been accepted. See Brief of Appellant, p. 42, 44-45. Because
Appellant has failed to properly attack the district court's factual findings, these
arguments are insufficient to establish reversible error.
Appellant's first argument is simple enough: Appellant's factual allegations
regarding her monthly monetary requirements should have been accepted by the court.
Appellant's second argument is more difficult to follow. Appellant initially suggests the
district court should have determined that additional alimony was proper pursuant to Utah
Code section 30-3-5(8)(a)(vii) (relating to educational expenses). However, Appellant
fails to give any reason why this section would apply, given the fact that Appellee's
"education" took place long ago and had no bearing on this case. See, e.g., Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, ^ 5, pp. 2-3 (R.2348-49) (noting that Appellee had already
accumulated his wealth through business ventures prior to the parties' marriage).
Appellant then suggests that the district court should have augmented her alimony award
based on her allegations of "contributions" to post-separation earnings. In each argument,
Appellant fails to make any citation to the record for the allegations she asserts. More
importantly, Appellant fails to even reference the district court's findings as to alimony.
The district court made numerous, detailed findings in regard to the amount of and
the basis for the alimony award. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Tfij 52-68,
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pp. 18-22 (R.2364-68). In the end, the district court even augmented the alimony award
by allowing for a significant "cushion" should Appellant remarry. See id., ^ 69-71, pp.
22-23 (R.2368-69).
To successfully challenge these findings, Appellant "must marshal the evidence in
support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's
findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence, thus
making them clearly erroneous." Shepherd v. Shepherd, 876 P.2d 429, 431 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994) (quotations and citations omitted). "Tf the appellant fails to marshal the
evidence, the appellate court assumes that the record supports the findings of the trial
court and proceeds to a review of the accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law and
the application of that law in the case.'" Id. (quoting Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198,
199 (Utah 1991)).
Plaintiff has made no effort to challenge the findings relating to alimony in the
instant case, and has failed to marshal any evidence in support thereof.2 Simply
reasserting a few facts, with no citation to the record, and no reference to the facts as
determined by the district court, falls far short of meeting Appellant's burden:
Again, to successfully challenge factual findings such

2

Indeed, the district court specifically rejected the testimony supplied by Appellant as to
the amount necessary, finding that "this amount is exaggerated and does not accurately reflect the
historic expenditures of the parties as documented in the evidence that was presented by both
parties." Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 156, p. 19 (R.2365). The district court also
specifically noted Appellee's work at the Resort, but determined that, under the prenuptial
agreement, this was deemed to be a gift. See id, % 52, p. 18 (R. 2364).
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as these, an appellant must first marshal all of the evidence
that supports the findings and then demonstrate that even
viewing it in the light most favorable to the district court, the
evidence is insufficient to support the finding. In her brief,
La Juana makes no effort to marshal the evidence in support
of the voluntariness findings; in fact, she does not even
mention the district court's findings. Instead, she simply
reargues the facts. This approach is inappropriate. The district
court is in the best position to weigh conflicting testimony,
assess credibility, and from this make findings of fact. An
appellate court does not lightly disturb the verdict of a jury or
the factual findings of a trial court. Accordingly, absent a
proper showing, we will not revisit the facts on appeal.
Matter of Estate ofBeesley, 883 P.2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1994) (citations omitted). This
Court may therefore assume that the record supports the district court's findings in regard
to the amount of the alimony award. This assumption necessarily precludes Appellant's
arguments.
District courts have "considerable discretion in determining alimony ... and
[determinations of alimony] will be upheld on appeal unless a clear and prejudicial abuse
of discretion is demonstrated." Riley v. Riley, 2006 UT App 214, % 15, 138 P.3d 84
(quoting Davis v. Davis, 2003 UT App 282, <|[ 7, 76 P.3d 716 (alterations in original)).
See also Andrus v. Andrus, 2007 UT App 291, ^ 9, 169 P.3d 754 ("We will review the
trial court's decisions regarding child support and alimony under the abuse of discretion
standard.").
Appellant's two arguments relating to the district court's alimony award fail to
show an abuse of discretion. Thus, Appellant has once again failed to provide any reason
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to disturb the district court's determination.
VI and VII. Appellant is Unable to Show the District Court Abused its
Discretion Regarding its Attorney Fee Determinations.
Appellant argues that the district court erred when it (1) awarded Appellee his
attorney fees pursuant to the terms of the prenuptial agreement, and (2) ordered Appellant
to pay a portion of her own fees incurred below. Appellant is unable to show that the
district court abused its discretion with regard to either determination.
"The decision to award attorney fees and the amount thereof rests primarily in the
sound discretiou of the trial court." Riley, 2006 UT App 214, f 15 (quoting Childs v.
Childs, 967 P.2d 942, 947 (Utah Ct. App.1998). This determination is reviewed for abuse
of that discretion. See Taylor v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 923, 931 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)
(overruled on other grounds by Sittner v. Schriever, 2000 UT 45, 2 P.3d 442). A district
court abuses its discretion "if there is no reasonable basis for the decision." Langeland v.
Monarch Motors, Inc., 952 P.2d 1058, 1061 (Utah 1998).
The district court's determinations regarding attorney fees were predicated on
numerous findings, see Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, ]ffl 72-85, pp. 24-27
(R.2370-73), including the following:
72. There are two attorney fee issues in this case:
(1) should Hope be required to reimburse Robert for all or
part of the attorney fees that he has advanced for her pursuant
to the Order of this Court; and (2) has either party prevailed in
a dispute arising out of the terms, conditions, and obligations
imposed by the Agreement, thus entitling them to recover
their attorney fees under paragraph Z of the Agreement.
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73.
The Court informed Hope on several occasions,
in order to ensure that it was clear to her, that it may require
her to reimburse Robert for the attorney fees that he was
required to advance to her. The Court also permitted Robert
to challenge the reasonableness of any fees billed by Hope's
counsel. The Court ordered Robert to pay Hope's reasonable
attorney fees to ensure that hope had an opportunity to present
her best case to the Court and that she not be overwhelmed by
Robert's resources.
74. Through June 30, 2007, Hope incurred litigation
expenses of $120,000 of which Robert has paid $80,000 and
disputed $40,000. At the close of trial, the Court ordered
Robert to pay the disputed fees which he has done.
75.
Through August 28, 2007, Robert had incurred
litigation expenses of $124,000 just in securing a
determination of the validity and enforcement of the
Agreement.
76.
The Court finds that Hope's fees were
reasonable and that her position was not so untenable that she
should be required to cover all of her own fees.
77.
The Court finds that Hope has approximately
$35,000.00 in a securities account that was gifted to her by
Robert during the course of the marriage as well as the
alimony that she will be receiving from Robert. At the
inception of this case, Hope did not have the resources to
match Robert's efforts without assistance that the Court finds
is no longer needed. The Court finds that Hope shall be
required to use the funds in her security account along with
her income, if needed, to cover at a minimum $30,000 of her
own fees, plus whatever amount her fees since June 30, 2007,
exceed $30,000.
78.
The Court finds that Robert shall not be
required to pay any further litigation expenses of Hope and, if
Hope's litigation expenses incurred since June 30, 2007 are
less than $30,000, Robert shall be entitled to a refund of the
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difference.
79.
The Court finds that Robert is the prevailing
party in the dispute arising out of the terms, conditions, and
obligations imposed by paragraph [Z] of the prenuptial
Agreement.
80. The Court finds that Hope's claims for
community property were based first on her efforts to
invalidate the Agreement, second on her claim that she was
co-owner of the Resort, and third, that she was entitled to onehalf of Robert's distributions from Flat Iron Mesa and onehalf of the operation cash flow of the Resort.
81.
The Court finds that Hope has failed to establish
any of these claims and cannot be considered the prevailing
party in the aspects of this dispute that involved the
Agreement.
82. The Court finds that Robert is the prevailing
party and in accordance with paragraph Z of the Agreement,
the Court must award Robert his fees incurred in connection
with the dispute over the application of the Agreement.
84. The Court finds that Robert is entitled to
recover these fees from Hope by deducting $5,000 from each
month's alimony payment and that the award of fees shall
bear interest at the rate of 6.99% per annum from October 1,
2007 until paid in full.
85. The Court recognizes that allowing Robert to
deduct $5,000 per month from awarded alimony of $15,000
per month will mean that Hope will not receive enough
money to maintain her at the standard of living she enjoyed
during the marriage. Hope will naturally have to curtail her
living standard but will still be able to maintain a comfortable
lifestyle. This temporary curtailment is the natural
consequence of her decision to pursue a claim for community
property when the clear intention of the Agreement she signed
before marrying was to sharply limit the creation of
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community property. That same Agreement requires that the
prevailing party in a dispute over the effect of the agreement
recovers attorney fees. To increase alimony so Hope can pay
those fees would make that portion of the Agreement
meaningless.
Id. Appellant makes no effort to challenge these findings, and this Court may therefore
assume that the record supports the district court's findings. See Shepherd v. Shepherd,
876 P.2d at 431; Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d at 199.
The district court further explained its ruling relating to Appellant's attorney fees
as follows:
With respect to [this] issue, the court promised, when it
originally required Robert to pay Hope's attorney fees, that it
may require her to reimburse him. It was important to ensure
that Hope had an opportunity to present her best case to the
court and that she not be overwhelmed by Robert's resources.
Hope incurred litigation expenses of $120,000 through June
30, 2007. Robert had paid $80,000 of those fees and disputed
$40,000. At the close of trial, the court instructed Robert to
pay those fees.... The theory on which Utah law permits a
court to require one party to a divorce to advance the fees of
the other is to permit each side an equal opportunity to present
its case. Hope did not have the resources to match Robert's
effort without assistance. However, she did have
approximately $35,000 in her securities account from gifts
Robert made during the course of the marriage. The court
should have required her to use that account at lest in
substantial part. The court will require that Hope pay $30,000
of her own fees, plus whatever amount her fees since June 30,
3007, exceed $30,000. In other words, Robert shall not be
required to pay any litigation expense incurred by Hope after
June 30, 2007, and, if those expenses are less than $30,000,
the difference shall be refunded to Robert.
Sept. 14, 2007 Memorandum Decision, pp. 25-26 (R.2253-54).
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Appellant filed a postjudgment motion relating to the award of attorney fees,
which was granted in part (namely, a reduction of alimony to pay for Appellee's fees
from $5,000 to $2,500 per month, see Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion
to Amend and Denying a New Trial, p. 2 (R.2542)) and denied in part (as to Appellant's
request for payment of her own fees):
[T]he motion should be granted to the extent of
decreasing the monthly payment of the awarded attorney fees
that the Respondent should make to the Petitioner by
reduction in her alimony from $5,000.00 to $2,500.00 per
month; that the request for attorney fees should be denied
pursuant to the provision of Paragraph Z of the Prenuptial
Agreement between the parties and the provisions of Section
30-3-3(1), which authorizes the Court to order payment of
costs and attorneys fees, which the Court had granted in part
and ordered Petitioner to pay and not reimburse Respondent
for a portion of her fees.
The Court previously determined that the first
$120,000 of Hope's fees were reasonable and does not
reconsider that determination. However, Hope's lack of
success on her property claims has affected the Court's
evaluation of her claim for additional fees. The Court's
decision does not involve any application of Sections 30-33(2) or (4), Utah Code. Were it to apply those sections, Hope
might be required to reimburse a good share of the $120,000
Robert has paid toward her fees. The Court also did not
consider, in evaluating Hope's motion, that Robert paid
$120,000 towards the purchase of a home for Petitioner and
the minor child of the parties before she began to accrue any
fees with her present counsel.
Id,
Appellant now argues that the district court erred when it awarded Appellee his
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fees, assigning error to the fact that the district court strictly applied the attorney fee
provision in the prenuptial agreement. Appellant also argues that the district court erred
when it determined that Appellant should pay a portion of her own fees. Each of these
arguments shall be addressed in turn.
a.

The District Court Correctly Interpreted the Prenuptial
Agreement When it Awarded Appellee His Attorney Fees.

There is no dispute that the prenuptial agreement was valid and binding on the
parties. Such agreements are "construed and treated as contracts in general." Shepherd v.
Shepherd, 876 P.2d 429, 431(Utah Ct. App. 1994). Furthermore, a court's award of
attorney fees in light of a valid prenuptial agreement is not governed by equitable law, it is
"controlled by the terms of the agreement governing challenges to its validity." Montoya v.
Montoya, 909 A.2d 947, 956 (Conn. 2006); see also Pysell v. Keck, 559 S.E.2d 677, 678
(Va. 2002) ("Antenuptial agreements, like marital properly settlements, are contracts
subject to the rules of construction applicable to contracts generally, including the
application of the plain meaning of unambiguous contractual terms.").
This contract provided that the prevailing party in a dispute involving the
Agreement "shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees, costs and expenses."
Prenuptial agreement, pg. 43 (emphasis added). The use of the term "shall" is "language
of command" and thus implies a mandatory condition. Herr v. Salt Lake County, 525 P.2d
728, 729 (Utah 1974). Therefore, the district court was required to award fees to the
prevailing party, Appellee.
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Rather than address the district court's findings, Appellant argues that the district
court erred when it determined it was compelled to apply the prenuptial agreement in this
manner. Appellant cites no authority supporting her position that a district court must
make additional findings before enforcing the terms of a valid contract. Instead, Appellant
argues without basis that public policy requires further investigation. This argument is
inadequate to overturn the district court's determination.
For instance, Appellant cites the Utah Premarital Agreement Act for the proposition
that parties may contract with respect to "any other matter, including their personal rights
and obligations, not in violation of public policy or a statute imposing a criminal penalty."
Utah Code Ann. § 30-8-4(1 )(g). However, there is no authority provided that an award of
attorney fees pursuant to the express terms of a contract violates any public policy.
Instead, Appellant's argument begs the question that is left unanswered - what violation of
public policy occurred in this instance?
Appellant cites to the "important public policy such public policy of giving both
parties the chance to present their claims." Appellant's Brief, p. 46. However, Appellant
ignores the fact that the district court specifically ordered Appellee to pay all of
Appellant's attorney fees through June 30, 2007, to ensure that Appellant had an equal
opportunity to present her case. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, ^f 73
(R.2370).
Appellant also cites to a Colorado case, In re Marriage oflkelar, 161 P.3d 663
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(Colo. 2007), for the proposition that an unconscionable prenuptial agreement need not be
enforced. The court in Ikelar was concerned with ensuring that both sides have adequate
resources to effectively litigate the case, not the enforceability of a valid agreement. Id. at
670-71. Thus, the district court's determination was consistent with Ikelar. In any event,
Appellant has set forth no argument as to why the prenuptial agreement is
"unconscionable" and fails to raise any facts that could support such an argument.
Indeed, this is contrary to the district court's determination that the prenuptial agreement
was valid and enforceable. See Ruling on Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (R.102934).
In the end, the law allows parties to a prenuptial agreement to agree to all matters
not in violation of public policy. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-8-4. Appellant has failed to
make any showing that the prenuptial agreement violated any particular public policy, or
that the district court erred when it interpreted and enforced that agreement.
b.

Appellant Shows No Abuse of Discretion Relating to the
District Court's Determination That Appellant Should Pay a
Portion of Her Own Attorney Fees.

Next, Appellant argues that the district court erred when it ordered her to pay a
portion of her own attorney fees incurred below. Appellant argues that this decision is
somehow inconsistent with section 30-3-3, and that the district court did not make required
findings under this section.
This argument is misguided for two reasons. First, it ignores the fact that this
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determination, as set forth above, was not based on interpretation of section 30-3-3. See
Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion to Amend, p. 2 (R.2542). Instead, the
determination that Appellant must pay a portion of her own fees was based on the
prenuptial agreement and the fact that Appellant was not the "prevailing party" in the
underlying action. See id. Appellant does not argue that the prenuptial agreement was
incorrectly interpreted, and certainly does not argue she was a prevailing party below.
In addition, this argument fails under the plain terms of section 30-3-3, which
provides in relevant part:
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3,
Divorce, Chapter 4, Separate Maintenance, or Title 78B,
Chapter 7, Part 1, Cohabitant Abuse Act, and in any action to
establish an order of custody, parent-time, child support,
alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, the court
may order a party to pay the costs, attorney fees, and witness
fees, including expert witness fees, of the other party to enable
the other party to prosecute or defend the action. The order
may include provision for costs of the action.
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, parenttime, child support, alimony, or division of property in a
domestic case, the court may award costs and attorney fees
upon determining that the party substantially prevailed upon
the claim or defense. The court, in its discretion, may award no
fees or limited fees against a party if the court finds the party is
impecunious or enters in the record the reason for not
awarding fees.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(1), (2) (emphasis added). This section "grants courts discretion
to award attorney fees in domestic cases. Trial courts have discretion to award fees, so
long as the award is based on findings regarding the need of the receiving spouse, the
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ability of the payor spouse to pay and the reasonableness of the fees." Schaumberg v.
Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 604 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
It is undisputed that the district court did, in fact, award Appellant $120,000 in
attorney fees in order to "prosecute or defend the action." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(1).
See Sept. 14, 2007 Memorandum Decision, pp. 25-26 (R.2253-54). Thus, Appellant
cannot (and does not) argue that the district court erred in some fashion under subsection
30-3-3(1).
Moreover, subsection 30-3-3(2) was not even applicable because the district court
determined that Appellant was not "the party [that] substantially prevailed upon the claim
or defense." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(2); see also Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, Tf 81 (R.2372). Instead, the district court utilized its discretion when it allowed
Appellant her fees up to $120,000, but refused to grant fees in excess of that amount.
Appellant fails to show that this constitutes an abuse of discretion. Indeed, the district
court had warned Appellant early on that this might, in fact, be the result:
He'll pay the attorney fees, but you need to understand
this is just for now, and this is just to ensure that she has an
opportunity to fairly litigate. But there is no reason why you
shouldn't think that in the end I will not give him credit against
everything he's required to pay her for everything he has
already paid, including her attorneys' fees.
See November 17, 2006 Evidentiary Hearing Transcript, pp. 167-68 (R. 2554). Because
the district court determined that Appellant was not the prevailing party, there was no
reason for the court to ensure that "the award is based on findings regarding the need of
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the receiving spouse, the ability of the payor spouse to pay and the reasonableness of the
fees." Schaumberg, 875 P.2d at 604. See Taylor v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 923, 931 ("Because
Taylor's motions were denied in their entirety, she was not entitled to an award of costs or
fees, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to award attorney fees or
costs to Taylor under section 30-3-3.") (citing Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 427
(Utah Ct. App. 1990)) (emphasis added).
In any event, Appellant's argument fails because the district court made sufficient
findings. In regard to ability to pay and need of the receiving spouse, the district court
determined that Appellee "has stipulated to the Court that he can afford any reasonable
alimony award," see Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, ^f 49 (R.2364), and
determined that Appellant had "$35,000 in her securities account from gifts Robert made
during the course of the marriage. The court should have required her to use that account
at lest in substantial part." Sept. 14, 2007 Memorandum Decision, pp. 25-26 (R.2253-54).
In addition, the district court noted that "the first $120,000 of Hope's fees were reasonable
and does not reconsider that determination. However, Hope's lack of success on her
property claims has affected the Court's evaluation of her claim for additional fees."
Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion to Amend, p. 2 (R.2542). Thus, even
if subsection 30-3-3(2) applied here, Appellant's argument that insufficient findings were
made, or that such findings do not support the district court's conclusion are unfounded.
In sum, Appellant fails to show the district court abused its discretion when it
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awarded Appellee his attorney fees pursuant to the prenuptial agreement or when it
ordered Appellant to pay a portion of her own fees.
Request for Attorney Fees Incurred on Appeal
Appellee was awarded attorney fees below as the "prevailing party" pursuant to the
terms of the parties' prenuptial agreement. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
1fl[ 79-85 (R.2371-73). Appellee is therefore entitled to attorney fees incurred on appeal.
See Pack v. Case, 2001 UT App 232, If 39, 30 P.3d 436 ( "When a party who received
attorney fees below prevails on appeal, the party is also entitled to fees reasonably incurred
on appeal." (Internal quotations and citation omitted.)).
Appellee hereby requests an award of his attorney fees incurred on appeal, and
requests remand to the district court for a determination of such fees.
Conclusion
Appellant fails to meet her burden on appeal. She is unable to show any error
committed by the district court, let alone reversible error. Accordingly, Appellee
respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's determinations and award
his attorney fees incurred on appeal.
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RECEIVED

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT KEITH LEVIN,

:
:
:
:
:
:
:

Petitioner,
v.
HOPE M. CARLTON-LEVIN

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Civil No. 05 470 0107
Judge: Lyle R. Anderson

Respondent.

This matter came regularly before the Court for a three-day bench trial before the
Honorable Lyle R. Anderson on September 5-7, 2007.

Petitioner was present and

represented by his counsel David S. Dolowitz and Joshua K. Peterman. Respondent was
present and represented by her counsel Kenneth A. Okazaki and Andrew G. Deiss. The

1

Court, having heard the testimony of the parties and witnesses for and on behalf of the
parties, and having considered the exhibits admitted into evidence during the course of the
trial and having considered the opinions of expert witnesses testifying on behalf of the parties
and being fully advised in the premises and having issued its Memorandum Decision on
September 14, 2007, now makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Petitioner and the Respondent were both residents of Grand County,

State of Utah, and had been so for three months prior to the filing of the above-entitled
action on December 22, 2005.
2.

Robert Keith Levin and Hope Marie Carlton Levin were married on

September 14, 1991 in the State of California.
3.

Each of the parties has asked the Court to end their marriage on the

ground that they have irreconcilable differences. The Court finds that the parties do have
irreconcilable differences which make continuation of their marriage impossible and each
is entitled to a divorce from the other.
4.

One child has been born as issue of this marriage, Calliway Jo, Age 10,

bom February 10, 1997.
5.

At the time of the marriage, Robert had accumulated assets worth over ten

million dollars. He had accumulated his wealth primarily in the women's apparel
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industry. At the date of marriage, Robert was completing his obligation to work for
Kellwood, the company to which he had sold his women's apparel business.
6.

At the time of the marriage, Hope was twenty-five (25) years old. She had

enjoyed some success in the film, television, and advertising industry as a model and
actress, but had certainly not become a star. She had acted in some obscure films, and her
television appearances were sporadic. The highest amount that Hope earned in one year
before she married Robert was $44,000.00 in 1989.
7.

Being concerned about protecting his present assets, future investments and

future business activities, Petitioner insisted that the parties negotiate and enter into a
prenuptial agreement.
8.

Before marrying, Robert and Hope signed a prenuptial agreement

("Agreement") which the Court determined on summary judgment was valid and
enforceable. The evidence presented at trial reinforces the Court's determination that the
Agreement is valid and enforceable.
9.

Both Robert and Hope were represented by capable counsel in negotiating

the prenuptial agreement and there were negotiations back and forth that resulted in a
final agreement that reflected input from both Hope and Robert.
10.

For three or four months after the wedding, Robert continued to receive

salary and residual payments from Kellwood. He testified his salary, under the prenuptial
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agreement, was community income and it was consumed as community support and the
Court finds this is correct under the prenuptial agreement and applicable California law.
11.

At the time Robert finally terminated from Kellwood, he received a final

buyout payment of approximately two (2) million dollars ($2,000,000.00) which, under
the prenuptial agreement remained his separate property.
12.

Shortly after they married, Robert and Hope moved to Park City, Utah

where they lived a luxurious leisure lifestyle which included frequent houseboating trips
at Lake Powell.
13.

Although living in Utah may have impeded development of Hope's career,

she was free to travel to other areas of the country to take advantage of any career
opportunities.
14.

In 1994, Robert purchased ranch property adjacent to the Colorado River in

Grand County, Utah. Robert and Hope moved to the ranch and began to develop it with
the intent to make it a destination resort.
15.

The ranch was purchased for $800,000.00 but Robert invested

approximately twelve million Dollars ($12,000,000.00) of his separate property including
some borrowed money in the development of the ranch. The ranch was named Sorrel
River Ranch Resort ("Resort").
16.

The process of transforming the ranch to a destination resort was difficult
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and both parties worked to effect the transformation. While the parties worked to build
the Resort, they also enjoyed numerous amenities at the resort. Hope was able to pursue
her love of horses as well as take advantage of the Resort's pool, spa, and dining room as
these amenities were developed.
17.

One of the benefits of living and working at the Resort is that many of the

parties' living expenses were covered by the business, in exchange for having the parties
readily accessible to work in the business.
18.

Robert elected to run the Resort through a limited liability company called

Levinius, L.L.C. ("Levinius"). The land on which the Resort is located is owned by other
Utah partnerships which are in turn owned by Levinius.
19.

Robert has sole control of the Resort through his control of Levinius.

Neither Levinius or any of the properties or entities through which the Resort is operated
were ever in Hope's name; title always remained in Robert's name.
20.

There are no written agreements granting Hope an ownership interest in the

Resort, Levinius, or any of the subsidiary companies.
21.

The Resort did not have any taxable earnings until 2005, when it reported

taxable income of approximately $200,000.00 on revenues of approximately four point
four million dollars ($4,400,000.00). Even after application of this 2005 income,
Levinius had accumulated taxable losses of approximately two (2) million
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($2,000,000.00) at the end of 2005. By this time, Levinius also had approximately three
point six million ($3,600,000.00) of accumulated depreciation.
22.

Hope's spending habits were the source of regular arguments between Hope

and Robert but the Court believes that Hope was generally able to purchase anything that
she wanted.
23.

In 2003, Robert became a passive investor in a limited liability company

that developed lots on Flat Iron Mesa in San Juan County, Utah. Robert was adamant
that he was so consumed with the development of the Resort that he could devote
virtually no time to the development of Flat Iron Mesa.
24.

John Ogden, the Managing Member of Flat Iron Mesa Partners, LLC did

virtually all of the work related to the development of Flat Iron Mesa project.
25.

Under the investment agreement for the Flat Iron Mesa project, Robert

received sixty per cent ( 60%) of the profits of the company and by the time that all of the
lots had been sold in 2007, Robert had received profits of approximately one point five
million ($1,500,000.00).
Issues Presented at Trial
26.

The parties resolved by stipulation all of the issues relating to custody,

parent time, and child support of their child Calli Jo. The Court approved this stipulation
and its implementing Order, as written. A copy of this Stipulation and Order is attached
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hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated by reference.
27.

The issues at trial were: (1) was there a breach of the Agreement that

would invalidate the Agreement; (2) the existence and amount of community
property;(3) the approximate amount and duration of alimony; and (4) attorney fees.
28.

The premarital agreement (Exhibit 6) is extensive and detailed. It provides

that it is to be interpreted pursuant to California law. Alimony is expressly excluded from
the Agreement and shall be awarded pursuant to Utah law.
Specific Findings of Fact In Regard to Each Issue Presented
A. COMMUNITY PROPERTY:
Alleged Breach of the Premarital Agreement
29.

The Court finds that there was no breach of the Agreement that would result

in an invalidation of the Agreement. Hope alleged several facts in support of her claim
that the Agreement should be invalidated; however, none of the instances, even if proven,
are sufficient to warrant an invalidation of the Agreement. Even if established, the Court
would be required to apply the rule that a contract is not invalidated except for a
substantial breach and none of the failures to perform alleged by Hope constitute such a
breach.
a.

Taxes-Paragraph O of the Agreement imposes on Robert the duty to
report his income on federal and state tax returns. Hope alleged that
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the deductions claimed by Robert on his tax returns raise a question
whether Robert satisfied this obligation. However, also in paragraph
O, Robert promises to indemnify Hope against any claims,
assessment, deficiencies, interest, penalties, fees, and costs
attributable to his income arising out of any filed tax return. This
specific remedy is the remedy available to Hope, not invalidation of
the Agreement.
b.

Insurance-Paragraph P of the Agreement imposes on Robert the duty
to maintain $250,000.00 of life insurance on himself naming Hope as
the beneficiary as long as they are married and living together.
Robert satisfied this obligation. This paragraph also requires Robert
to notify Hope before cancelling the insurance. Robert has cancelled
the policy since separation but did not notify Hope that he had done
so. However, this paragraph provides the specific remedy for this
failure. Robert essentially became an insurer of his life and would
have been required to pay $250,000.00 to Hope if he died without
insurance in force. This specific remedy trumps the general remedy
of invalidating the agreement. Obviously, now that Hope knows that
the insurance has been cancelled, it is her responsibility to secure
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replacement coverage if desired. Robert's only duty will be to
cooperate with that process.
c.

Good Faith and Fair Dealing-Hope alleged that Robert manipulated
his activities and the financial statements of his companies and the
payment or non-payment of salary to prevent the accumulation of
community property and that he had to work in ways that created
community property. Hope's argument is undermined by Paragraph
F.2 of the Agreement which permits Robert to pursue any vocation,
occupation or profession. Hope failed to persuade the Court that
Robert manipulated any opportunity to receive salary. The Court
finds that it was reasonable for Robert to work at the Resort without
compensation as long as the Resort was not profitable. Even after
the Resort became profitable, it was reasonable for Robert to wait
until he had received a return on his initial capital investment before
paying himself a salary. Even though neither Robert or Hope ever
received a salary from the Resort, they each received extensive and
substantial benefits from living at the Resort.

d.

Fiduciary Duty-The Agreement is clear that a fiduciary duty exists
only when community property exists. The Court finds that there
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was and is no community property and therefore, Robert had no
fiduciary duty to Hope.

Partnership
30.

The Court finds that Hope has presented no agreement signed by Robert

which makes her a partner in any of his business enterprises. The prenuptial agreement
provides that community property comes into existence only as the Agreement provides.
Paragraph D.3 clearly provides that Robert's separate property becomes community
property only if a document of tide so indicates and Robert clearly acknowledges the
relinquishment of a one-half interest in the property. No evidence of such a document
was produced and Robert testified no such document had ever been created or executed.
Hope did not contradict this testimony.
31.

The Court finds that Hope's claim that she became a partner in Robert's

separate property via verbal conduct is not credible nor supported by law. Hope
presented evidence that Robert talked to her on several occasions to tell her she must
conduct herself as an "owner." Robert denies these conversations ever took place and
that he and Hope frequently argued about her lack of ownership. Hope also presented a
video clip of a television show featuring the Resort which described her as "co-owner."
32.

The Court is aware of no authority that creates an ownership interest simply
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because third parties believe such ownership exists. The theory of partnership by
estoppel, as asserted by Hope, cannot be used to create a partnership interest. The
purpose of this theory is to protect creditors who relied on representations that they were
dealing with a partnership. Additionally, the Agreement expressly provides in paragraph
W.2 that the use of such expressions such as "our property," "our house," "our bank
account," or other similar phrases does not alter the characterization of separate property.
33.

Hope presented the testimony of Stuart Berman who briefly held an

ownership interest in the Resort. Mr. Berman testified that all discussions between him
and Robert included the implicit assumption that Hope was a co-owner of Robert's
interest. The Court finds that Mr. Berman's testimony is not credible. His testimony is
undermined by his obvious anger at Robert, which persists even though he made
$475,000.00 on an investment of $1,721,000.00 in just eight (8) months. His testimony is
also seriously undermined by the actual language of the agreements between himself and
Robert that Mr. Berman had drafted. Hope appears in only one of these agreements, and
only in the capacity of a consenting spouse, which a careful California lawyer would
require when dealing with a married man who insists his wife has no ownership interest.
The Court finds that it is obvious that Mr. Berman knew that Hope was not a co-owner.
34.

The Court also finds that Hope's argument that her putative ownership

interest in Levinius is unaffected by the Agreement's requirement of a writing because
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Levinius is not a party to the Agreement is without merit. Robert is a party to this action
and is entitled to the protection of the Agreement
35.

The Court finds that Hope's claim that she became a partner of Robert's

entities by virtue of a verbal agreement is rejected because (1) the Agreement expressly
requires a written agreement to create a partnership; and (2) Hope's claims that a verbal
agreement was made are not credible.
Earnings
36.

The Agreement, paragraphs D and F. 1 reverses the presumption under

California law that any income resulting from the efforts of a husband or wife during
marriage, and any property acquired with that income, is community property. Instead, all
income, and all property acquired with that income, is separate property unless the
Agreement provides otherwise.
37.

Subparagraph D. 1 of the Agreement provides that earnings are governed by

paragraph F. Subparagraph F. 1 of the Agreement provides that earnings from personal
services, skills, efforts, talents, or work are separate property, except as the Agreement
specifically provides. Subparagraph F.2 of the Agreement creates a community property
right in the "earnings" or "base salary" derived from actual effort or employment of
Robert. Earnings or base salary are defined as compensation for labor or services
performed by Robert, but do not include any benefits associated with such earnings or
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base salary.
38.

The only earnings or base salary derived from actual efforts of Robert were

paid to him during the first four months following the marriage and were promptly
consumed on community expenses, thus leaving no community property.
39.

Subparagraph F.3 of the Agreement provides that:
In the event [Robert] enters into any type of business venture or ventures
from and after the date of marriage from which [Robert] will receive
earnings or salary therefrom (regardless of whether such earnings or salary
have been derived from actual effort or services performed by [Robert] for
or on behalf of the business venture), such earnings or salary, derived from
such business venture or ventures, shall be community property. For
purposes of this paragraph f.3, the term "earnings" or "salary" derived from
said business venture or ventures excludes pension and deferred income
contributions, stock, stock options, bonuses, benefits and rights and
perquisites, which items shall remain [Robert's] separate property subject to
Paragraphs F.5, F.6, and F.7. It is the parties intention that all property
acquired with such "earnings" or "salary" (defined under this Paragraph
F.3) shall be community property unless the parties agree otherwise in
writing.

40.

The parties dispute the meaning of the term "earnings" as used in F.3.

Robert maintains that the inclusion of the phrase "whether such earnings or salary have
been derived from actual effort or services performed by Robert for or on behalf of the
business venture" simply loosens the requirement that Robert actually perform services
for his business venture to make his earnings or salary community property and the term
"earnings" still has the customary meaning under California law. California law defines
earnings as salary or wages of a person received because of services provided. Hope
13

maintains that the term "earnings" as used in F.3 includes any and all profits allocated to
Robert from Flat Iron Mesa and the Resort.
41.

This Court is required to read the Agreement as a whole in order to

determine the meaning and intent of the parties and to harmonize its various provisions.
Therefore, Subparagraph F.3 must be interpreted in light of the following provisions of
the Agreement:
a.

Subparagraph F.4 which defines Kellwood payments, except salary,
as separate property.

b-

Subparagraph F.5 which creates a community property right in
bonuses received by Robert as an employee under limited
circumstances. The Court finds that none of these limited
circumstances apply.

c.

Subparagraph F.6 which provides an additional community property
right in bonuses based on the duration of the marriage. The Court
finds that there were no bonuses paid to Robert that would invoke
this subparagraph.

d.

Subparagraph F.7 which provides a community property right in
pension payments based on longevity of the marriage. The Court
finds that Robert has not received any pension payments.
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e.

Subparagraph F.8 excludes any community property participation in
stock options or dividends.

f.

Subparagraph F.9 which provides that earnings or salary from joint
business ventures are community property, but joint business
ventures must be established by written agreement. The Court finds
that there were no joint business ventures.

g.

Paragraph I of the Agreement provides that all profits, rents,
increase, appreciation and income from Robert's separate property
are also his property. A change in the form of Robert's separate
property does not change the characterization of that property. If
Robert sells separate property and purchases other property, that new
property is also Robert's separate property.

h.

Paragraph J of the Agreement provides that devoting time, skill or
effort to separate property does not change it to community property.

42.

The Court finds that Hope's asserted meaning of the term "earnings" as

used in subparagraph F.3 to mean any kind of profit from any business venture to be
incorrect. The Court accepts Robert's interpretation as valid under California law and
finds that the term "earnings" means payments based at least in theory on services, such
as actual salary, guaranteed payments to a member in a limited liability company, or
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draws to a partner in an operating business partnership. Any other interpretation would
be in conflict with the remainder of the Agreement and render it superfluous. The Court
finds it hard to believe that Robert went to the trouble of obtaining such a comprehensive
and detailed prenuptial agreement so that he could ensure that Hope could claim one-half
of the profits from any business venture in which he would become involved.
43.

Hope also attempted to persuade the Court that Robert was actively engaged

in the management of Flat Iron Mesa. The Court rejects this argument and finds that
Robert had virtually no active involvement in Flat Iron. He was a passive investor. Even
if the Court were to adopt Hope's argument however, there would still not be any
earnings as contemplated by the Agreement because it was Robert's capital investment,
not his business efforts, that resulted in profits from Flat Iron.
44.

The Court finds that Robert did not receive any earnings or salary from the

Resort or Flat Iron Mesa as contemplated by the Agreement and there is no community
property.
45.

Although the Court finds that the Agreement is unambiguous and can be

interpreted as a matter of law, even if the Court were to consider parol evidence, its
interpretation of the term "earnings" would be the same. Robert testified that he always
intended that Hope would only participate in his base salary and then in bonuses and
pension payments in the limited circumstances set forth above. Robert specifically
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remembers discussing the contents of F.3 and understanding it to mean that Hope would
only participate in his wages, salary, or other similar payments resulting from any new
active business he may start. Robert's interpretation of the term "earnings" is consistent
with the overall expressed purpose of the Agreement. Hope had virtually no recollection
of the specific provisions of the Agreement even though her attorney discussed the terms
of the Agreement with her on numerous occasions. Hope's description of what she
understood the Agreement to mean was general and did not appear to be based on any
actual memory of the language of the Agreement or advice of her counsel.
B.

ALIMONY

46.

In making its alimony determination, the Court has considered: (1) the

financial conditions and needs of Hope; (2) the ability of Hope to produce a sufficient
income for herself; (3) the ability of Robert to provide support; (4) the length of the
marriage; (5) whether Hope has custody of minor children requiring support; (6) whether
the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the payor spouse; and (7)
whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor spouse's
skill by paying for education received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse to
attend school during the marriage.
47.

Although some evidence of fault was presented, the Court has not

considered the fault of either of the parties in making its determination.
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48.

The Court finds that it need not reach a specific finding regarding the

second factor because its alimony determination does not impute any income to Hope that
would reduce the alimony award.
49.

Robert has stipulated to the Court that he can afford any reasonable alimony

award, thus fulfilling the Court's inquiry into the third factor.
50.

The Court finds that alimony should be awarded for a duration consistent

with the length of the parties' marriage subject to the conditions set forth below in
paragraph 71, that is fourteen (14) years and three (3) months.
51.

The Court finds that Hope currently has primary physical custody of the

parties' child and that the child's needs are met through the level of child support to
which the parties have stipulated and agreed. The amount of the child support that the
parties agreed to exceeds the guidelines set forth in the Utah Code and meets the actual
needs of the child. If the parties agree that the child should attend private school, Robert
should be responsible for paying reasonable tuition.
52.

The Court finds that Hope did work at the Resort which is owned and

operated by Robert as his separate property. However, subparagraph J.3 of the
Agreement specifically provides that the expenditure of time, effort, skill, and money by
one party for the benefit of the separate property of the other party shall be deemed to be a
gift to the other unless otherwise agreed to in writing. No such writing was ever created.
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53.

The Court finds that the financial conditions and needs of Hope to maintain

Hope in the lifestyle to which she was accustomed during the marriage requires an
alimony award of $15,000.00 per month subject to the conditions set forth below in
paragraph 71.
54.

The Court has reached its alimony award by looking at the documented

historic expenditures to approximate what monthly alimony payment will enable Hope to
enjoy the standard of living that she enjoyed during the marriage.
55.

The Court finds that the parties spent approximately $9,000.00 per month

on Hope's expenses before separation and after separation, Hope spent approximately
$10,500.00 per month.
56.

Hope presented expert testimony from Richard Hoffman that her pre-

separation expenses were for luxuries and that her necessities were provided for as an
incident to her living at the Resort. Mr. Hoffman testified that in order to restore her
marital standard of living, Hope would need alimony of $ 19,707.00 per month.

Mr.

Hoffman also added to this figures $5,000.00 per month for income taxes, and $6,800.00
per month to allow Hope to purchase and additional residence fpr $1,000,000.00. Thus,
Hope demanded alimony of $30,000.00 per month but the Court finds that this amount is
exaggerated and does not accurately reflect the historic expenditures of the parties as
documented in the evidence that was presented by both parties.
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57. The Court rejects that the $5,000.00 Robert gave Hope each of the last three
(3) months pnor to separation represents any effort to match actual historic expenditures.
Hope's expert substituted this $5,000.00 for the documented $1,800.00 in pre-separation
monthly expenditures. The Court finds that the $1,800.00 accurately represent^Jhat
parties' actual expenditures and accordingly reduces Mr. Hoffman's proposed budget by
$3,200.00.
58.

The Court also rejects Mr. Hoffman's proposal that Hope be awarded

alimony sufficient for her to afford a one million dollar ($1,000,000.00) residence. The
Court finds that Hope's present residence is similar in appearance and quality to the
residence in which she lives at the Resort. Accordingly, the Court reduces Hope's
proposed budget by $6,800.00 which is the monthly amount that he had included for the
purchase of a new home.
59.

The Court finds that Mr. Hoffman's proposed monthly bam expenses of

$2,100.00 for three horses is overstated. Based on the actual documented expenditures
related to caring for horses at the Resort, sometimes including these same horses, and
recognizing the fact that there were economies of scale at the Resort that Hope may not
now enjoy, the Court finds that Hope's bam expenses will be $600.00 per month.
Accordingly, the Court reduces Hope's proposed budget by $1,500.00.
60.

The Court finds that Hope's proposed budget includes $550.00 per month
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for private school tuition for the parties' child. The Court finds that the child does not
currently attend private school and the Court cannot determine whether the child will
need or want to attend private school in the future. The Court also finds that the child's
tuition would not properly be treated as alimony but rather as child support and
accordingly eliminates $550.00 from Hope's proposed budget.
61.

The Court also finds that because it is not imputing any income to Hope,

thus requiring her to work outside the home, Hope does not require a housekeeper or
nanny to match her marital standard of living. Since Hope no longer has duties at the
Resort, she is able to maintain the property where she now lives without the need to hire
any employees. The Court finds that this arrangement will not cause Hope to work any
harder than she did during the marriage. Accordingly, the Court eliminates these figures
from Hope's proposed budget.
62.

The Court also eliminates from Hope's proposed budget the $ 1,150.00 per

month that she had allocated for "savings." The Court finds that the purpose of alimony
is to permit the maintenance of a marital standard of living for a specified period after the
termination of the marriage, not to allow the setting aside of a nest egg to maintain the
marriage partner thereafter. There is nothing in the evidence to suggest that Robert
regularly set aside any money for Hope's retirement during the marriage.
63.

Robert also presented a budget to the Court but the Court finds that
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Robert's proposed budget understates certain expenses and makes certain assumptions
that the Court rejects.
64.

The Court finds that although Robert may not have liked the fact that Hope

received laser hair removal treatment and plastic surgery, Hope maintaining her
appearance with surgical and similar procedures was a routine part of life for Hope.
65.

As the Court finds that Hope should not be required to work outside the

home, it does not impute any income to Hope.
66.

The Court's best estimate of barn expenses is $600 per month.

67.

With the foregoing adjustments, and considering the actual expenditures of

the parties during their marriage, the Court finds that Hope will require $12,000.00 per
month after taxes to maintain her marital standard of living and thus found that she would
need a monthly payment of $15,000.00.
68.

Neither parties' expert calculated the tax burden for alimony at this level.

Mr. Hoffman estimated that the combined federal and state tax burden on $24,500.00 of
monthly alimony was approximately twenty per cent (20%). Based on the calculation
supplied by Hope's expert, the Court finds that monthly alimony of $15,000.00 should
yield Hope $12,000.00 after taxes.
69.

The Court finds that Robert and Hope were married fourteen (14) years and

(3) three months before separation, thus making the duration of alimony presumptively
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fourteen years and three months.
70.

Alimony usually terminates on remarriage or cohabitation. Hope argued

that special circumstances-her loss of a potentially rewarding career as a model and
actress-warrant making the alimony non-terminable. The Court finds that it is hard to
imagine anything more speculative than the future film or modeling career of someone
who has not achieved "star" or "super model" status. However, the Agreement authorizes
the Court to consider Hope's career as a factor in any aspect of alimony.
71.

The Court finds that in order to permit Hope to make a gradual adjustment

to a different lifestyle if she should decide to remarry, as well as a cushion towards
establishing a new career, alimony should last for five years even if Hope remarries or
cohabits and that it should continue thereafter, even with remarriage or cohabitation, at a
reduced level of $7,500.00 per month for five more years after which it will be
eliminated. To clarify, if Hope remarries or cohabits before October 1, 2012, alimony
will not be reduced or eliminated until October 1, 2012, when it will be reduced to
$7,500.00, regardless of whether Hope is still remarried or cohabitating. If Hope
remarries or cohabits after October 1, 2012, but before October 1, 2017, it will be reduced
to $7,500.00 until October 1, 2017, when it will be eliminated regardless of whether Hope
is still remarried or cohabitating. Remarriage or cohabitation after October 1, 2017 will
cause an immediate elimination of alimony.
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C.

ATTORNEY FEES

72.

There are two attorney fee issues in this case: (1) should Hope be required

to reimburse Robert for all or part of the attorney fees that he has advanced for her
pursuant to the Order of this Court; and (2) has either party prevailed in a dispute arising
out of the terms, conditions, and obligations imposed by the Agreement, thus entitling
them to recover their attorney fees under paragraph Z of the Agreement.
73.

The Court informed Hope on several occasions, in order to ensure that it

was clear to her, that it may require her to reimburse Robert for the attorney fees that he
was required to advance to her. The Court also permitted Robert to challenge the
reasonableness of any fees billed by Hope's counsel. The Court ordered Robert to pay
Hope's reasonable attorney fees to ensure that hope had an opportunity to present her best
case to the Court and that she not be overwhelmed by Robert's resources.
74.

Through June 30, 2007, Hope incurred litigation expenses of $120,000.00

of which Robert has paid approximately $80,000.00 and disputed approximately
$40,000.00. At the close of trial, the Court ordered Robert to pay the disputed fees which
he has done.
75.

Through August 28, 2007, Robert had incurred litigation expenses of

$124,000.00 just in securing a determination of the validity and enforcement of the
Agreement.
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76.

The Court finds that Hope's fees were reasonable and that her position was

not so untenable that she should be required to cover all of her own fees.
77.

The Court finds that Hope has approximately $35,000.00 in a securities

account that was gifted to her by Robert during the course of the marriage as well as the
alimony that she will be receiving from Robert. At the inception of this case, Hope did
not have the resources to match Robert's efforts without assistance that the Court finds is
no longer needed. The Court finds that Hope should be required to use the funds in her
security account along with her income, if needed, to cover at a minimum $30,000 of her
own fees, plus whatever amount her fees since June 30,2007, exceed $30,000.
78.

The Court finds that Robert should not be required to pay any further

litigation expenses of Hope and, if Hope's litigation expenses incurred since June 30,
2007 are less than $30,000.00, Robert should be entitled to a refund of the difference.
79.

The Court finds that Robert is the prevailing party in the dispute arising out

of the terms, conditions, and obligations imposed by paragraph Z of the prenuptial
Agreement.
80.

The Court finds that Hope's claims for community property were based first

on her efforts to invalidate the Agreement, second on her claim that she was co-owner of
the Resort, and third, that she was entitled to one-half of Robert's distributions from Flat
Iron Mesa and one-half of the operation cash flow of the Resort.
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81.

The Court finds that Hope has failed to establish any of these claims and

cannot be considered the prevailing party in the aspects of this dispute that involved the
Agreement.
82.

The Court finds that Robert is the prevailing party and in accordance with

paragraph Z of the Agreement, the Court must award Robert his fees incurred in
connection with the dispute over the application of the Agreement.
83.

The Court finds that Robert has established reasonable and necessary fees

and charges in the amount of $167,884.75 through the end of trial that were related to
enforcing the terms, conditions, and obligations imposed by the Agreement.
84.

The Court finds that Robert is entitled to recover these fees from Hope by

deducting $5,000.00 from each month's alimony payment and that the award of fees shall
bear interest at the rate of 6.99% per annum from October 1, 2007 until paid in full.
85.

The Court recognizes that allowing Robert to deduct $5,000 per month from

awarded alimony of $15,000 per month will mean that Hope will not receive enough
money to maintain her at the standard of living she enjoyed during the marriage. Hope
will naturally have to curtail her living standard but will still be able to maintain a
comfortable lifestyle. This temporary curtailment is the natural consequence of her
decision to pursue a claim for community property when the clear intention of the
Agreement she signed before marrying was to sharply limit the creation of community
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property. That same Agreement requires that the prevailing party in a dispute over the
effect of the agieement recovers attorney fees. To increase alimony so Hope can pay
those fees would make that portion of the Agreement meaningless.
Based on the preceding findings, the Court enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court concludes that it has jurisdiction over the parties to this action,

their minor child, and the subject matter of the action.
2.

Robert and Hope should be awarded a Decree of Divorce terminating their

marriage which should become final upon entry.
3.

The Order based on the stipulation entered into by the parties relating to

child support, parent time, and custody of Callie Jo, attached hereto as Exhibit "A," is in
the best interest of the child and shall be accepted and ratified by the Court and
incorporated into the Decree of Divorce.
4.

The prenuptial Agreement entered into by the parties is valid, binding, and

enforceable as written.
5.

There was no breach of the prenuptial Agreement that would require the

Court to invalidate the Agreement.
6.

Hope is not a partner in the Resort, Levinius, LLC, Flat Iron Mesa, or any

other entity in which Robert has any interest.
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7.

The prenuptial Agreement is unambiguous and can be interpreted and

applied as a matter of law.
8.

The only salary or earnings that Robert has received since the date of the

parties' marriage was received during the first four months of marriage and was
immediately consumed by community living expenses, thus resulting in no community
property pursuant to the prenuptial Agreement.
9.

Robert has not received any other earnings or salary as contemplated by the

prenuptial Agreement from any venture or entity, including but not limited to, the Resort
or Flat Iron Mesa that would result in the creation of community property.
10.

There is no community property that would create a marital estate subject to

division between Robert and Hope under their premarital agreement.
11.

Hope should be awarded alimony as follows:
a.

If Hope does not remarry or cohabit, she should receive monthly
alimony payments of $15,000.00 for fourteen (14) years and three (3)
months commencing on October 1, 2007.

b.

If Hope remarries or cohabits within five years of October 1, 2007,
she should receive an alimony award of $15,000 per month until
October 1, 2012 after which she should receive a reduced monthly
alimony award in the amount of $7,500.00 regardless of whether she
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is still remarried or cohabitation until October 1, 2017 after which
date alimony will terminate.
c.

If Hope remarries or cohabits after October 1, 2012, her alimony
award should be immediately reduced to $7,500.00 per month until
October 1, 2017 after which her alimony will terminate regardless of
whether she is still remarried or cohabitation.

d.

If Hope remarries or cohabits after October 1, 2017, but before the
passage of fourteen (14) years and three (3) months, alimony shall
immediately cease.

12.

The alimony payments herein above awarded should be considered to be

governed by § 71 of the Internal Revenue Code and be tax deductible to Robert and
taxable income to Hope pursuant to §215 of the Internal Revenue Code.
13.

Hope shall pay, at a minimum, $30,000.00 of her legal fees by paying all of

her fees and expenses incurred since June 30, 2007 and if these fees are less than
$30,000.00, she should pay Robert a refund of the difference.
14.

Robert is not required to pay any further litigation expenses on behalf of

Hope, including but not limited to, attorney fees, costs, and witness fees.
15*

Robert is the prevailing party in this action and pursuant to paragraph Z of

the prenuptial Agreement, Robert is entitled to recover the $167,884.75 in legal fees that

29

he incurred in enforcing the terms, conditions, and obligations imposed by the prenuptial
Agreement.

This balance should accrue interest at the rate of 6.99% per annum from

October 1, 2007 until paid in full.
16.

Robert is entitled to recover these fees from Hope by deducting $5,000.00

per month from her alimony payment until the $167,884.75 together with interest is paid
in full. An amortization table reflecting the payment schedule is attached hereto as
Exhibit B.
DATED this

day of

, 2007.
BY THE COURT:

Honorable Lyle R. Anderson
Seventh District Court Judge

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 10-17-07 wpd
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C.,257 East 200 South, 7th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111, and that on the / g

day of October, 2007,1 caused a true and correct copy of the

foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to be served by U.S.
Mail to the following individual(s):
Kenneth A. Okazaki, Esq.
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EXHIBIT 2
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THE SEVENTH DISTRICT JUDICIAL COURT IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT KEITH LEVIN,
Plaintiff,
vs

RULING

Case No. 054700107

HOPE M. CARLTON-LEVIN
Defendants,

Judge Lyle R. Anderson

The court has reviewed the findings, conclusions and decree
submitted by petitioner and the objection filed by respondent.
Because the court has determined that some language should be
changed, it will not sign the submitted findings, conclusions and
decree.
The court directs that counsel for petitioner make the
following changes:
1.

Paragraph 15 of the findings should be amended by adding

"including some borrowed money" between "property" and "in" in
the first sentence.

"Name" in the second sentence should be

changed to "named."
2.

Paragraph 29.b. of the findings should be changed by

deleting the last sentence and adding "Obviously, now that Hope
knows the insurance has been cancelled, it is her responsibility
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to secure replacement coverage if desired.

Robert's only duty

will be to cooperate with that process."
3.

Paragraph 29.c. of the findings should be changed to add

"the financial statements of his companies and the payment or
non-payment of salary" between "activities" and "to" in the first
sentence.
4.

Paragraph 40 of the findings should be changed to delete

"any business venture" from the last sentence and replace it with
"Flat Iron Mesa and the Resort."
5.

Paragraph 52 of the findings should be changed by

deleting the last sentence.
6.

Paragraph 53 should be deleted in its entirety.

7.

A paragraph should be added after current paragraph 66,

which reads "The court's best estimate of "barn expenses" is $600
per month."
8.

The "2" in paragraph 79 should be changed to " Z . "

9.

Paragraph 15 of the decree should be changed by adding,

"only" between "is" and "entitled." and adding these sentences,
"Notwithstanding this deduction, the court clarifies that the
amount of alimony Hope is to be paid is $15,000 per month, from
which a deduction to pay this judgment is to be made.
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Hope's

alimony is not reduced; a deduction is being made to pay the
judgment."
The other objections made by respondent are noted and
overruled.

Respondent correctly notes that some of the findings

go beyond what was expressly stated in the Memorandum Decision.
Where those proposed findings reflect findings the court
implicitly made or would have made if asked to do so, they are
now adopted by the court by overruling the objection.

Where the

court has directed that words be deleted, no finding is made and
no negative implication of a contrary finding should be inferred.
The court recognizes that allowing Robert to deduct $5,000
per month from awarded alimony of $15,000 per month will mean
that Hope will not receive enough money to maintain her at the
standard of living she enjoyed during marriage.

She will

naturally have to curtail her living standard, but will still be
able to maintain a comfortable lifestyle.

This temporary

curtailment is the natural consequence of her decision co pursue
a claim for community property when the clear intention of the
agreement she signed before marrying was to sharply limit the
creation of community property.

That same agreement requires

that the prevailing party in a dispute over the effect of the
agreement recovers attorney fees.
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To increase alimony so Hope

can pay those fees would make that portion of the agreement
meaningless.

Dated this

day of October, 2007.

iy'le R. Anderson, District Judge

4

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
following people f ° r case 054700107 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Mail

Mail

Dated this

/</

NAME
STEPHEN C CLARK
Attorney RES
170 SOUTH MAIN ST STE 1500
SALT LAKE CITY, UT
84101-1020
DAVID S DOLOWITZ
Attorney PET
257 E 200 S STE 700
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111
KENNETH A OKAZAKI
Attorney RES
170 S MAIN ST STE 1500
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101
DENA C SARANDOS
Attorney PET
FAMILY LAW
257 E 200 S STE 700
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111

!0^7

day of

S^^p^y

Page 1 (last)

Court

EXHIBIT 3

THE SEVENTH DISTRICT JUDICIAL COURT IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT KEITH LEVIN,
Plaintiff,
vs

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case No. 054700107

HOPE M. CARLTON LEVIN
Defendants,

Judge Lyle R. Anderson

Robert Keith Levin ("Robert") and Hope Marie Carlton-Levin
("Hope") were married on September 14, 1991. Both have now asked
the court to end their marriage on the ground that they have
irreconcilable differences.

The court finds that they do have

irreconcilable differences, and that each is entitled to a
divorce from the other.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Robert had assets worth over $10 million when Robert and
Hope married.

He accumulated his wealth primarily in the women's

apparel industry.

When the couple married, he was just

completing his obligation to work for Kellwood, the company co
which he had sold his women's apparel business.

For three or

four months after the wedding, he continued to receive salary
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from Kellwood.

He also received residual payments based on the

success of the business he had sold to Kellwood.
At the time they married, Hope was 25 years old.

She had

enjoyed some success in the film, television and advertising
industry as a model and actress, but had certainly not become a
star.

She had acted in some obscure films, and her television

appearances were sporadic.

Even though her public debut was in

1985, the highest amount she earned before she married Robert was
$44,000 in 1989.
Before marrying, Robert and Hope signed a Prenuptial
Agreement (the "Agreement").

The court determined on summary

judgment that the Agreement was valid at its inception.

The

evidence presented at trial reinforces the court's summary
determination.

Hope and Robert were both represented by capable

counsel and there were negotiations back and forth that resulted
in an agreement that reflected input from both Hope and Robert.
Shortly after they married, Robert and Hope moved to Park
City, Utah.

They lived a luxurious leisure lifestyle in Park

City, which included frequent trips to Lake Powell to relax on
their houseboat.

Living in Utah may have impeded development of

Hope's career, but she was free to travel to other areas to take
advantage of career opportunities.
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Hope and Robert had money and

time to enjoy a wide variety of travel and entertainment
opportunities.
In 1994, Robert purchased ranch property adjacent to the
Colorado River in Grand County, Utah.

Robert and Hope moved to

the ranch and began to develop it with an eye to making it a
destination resort.

The ranch was purchased for $800,000, but

Robert eventually invested about $11 million in the ranch,
including some borrowed money.

At some point, the ranch became

known as Sorrel River Ranch Resort (the "Resort").

The Resort

did not have taxable earnings until 2 005, when it reported
taxable income of about $200,000 on revenues of about $4.4
million.
The process of getting from a traditional ranch to a
destination resort was difficult.
effect the transformation.
1997.

Both Robert and Hope worked to

Their daughter, Calli Jo, was born in

While Robert and Hope worked to build the Resort and make

it a success, they also continued to enjoy numerous amenities at
the Resort.

Hope was able to pursue her love of horses because

the Resort had a barn and included horseback riding as a service
available to guests.

As a spa, pool, and dining room were

developed at the Resort, Hope was able to take advantage of those
amenities.

Thus, even though Hope worked in the business, she
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also continued to enjoy an amenities lifestyle.

Although Hope's

expenditures were the source of regular arguments between Hope
and Robert, the court believes she was generally able to purchase
anything she desired to purchase.
Beginning in 2003, Robert became an investor in a limited
liability company that developed lots on Flat Iron Mesa in San
Juan County, Utah.

Robert was willing to invest in the company

and keep the financial records, but was adamant that he was so
consumed with the development of the Resort that he could devote
virtually no time to the development on Flat Iron Mesa.

Another

member of that company, John Ogden, did virtually all of the
work.

Robert received 60% of the profits of that company.

By

the time all of the lots had been sold in 2007, Robert had
received profits of about $1.5 million.
Hope and Robert both agree that one of the benefits of
living and working at the Resort is that many of the expenses of
living were covered by the business, in exchange for having Hope
and Robert readily accessible to work in the business.
Robert elected to run the Resort through a limited liability
company called Levinius, L.L.C. ("Levinius").

It appears that

the land on which the Resort is located is owned by other limited
liability companies which are in turn owned by Levinius.
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In

short, Robert controls the Resort through his control of
Levinius.

There are no written agreements granting Hope an

ownership interest in the Resort, Levinius, or any of the
subsidiary companies.
Levinius did not show taxable income until 2005.

Even after

the application of 2 005 income, Levinius had accumulated taxable
losses of about $2 million at the end of 2005.

By that time,

Levinius also had about $3.6 million of accumulated depreciation.
THE ISSUES
Commendably, Robert and Hope have resolved all of the issues
relating to their child, Calli Jo, who is now ten years old.

The

court hereby approves their stipulation regarding custody, parent
time, and child support.
The two issues litigated at trial were 1) the existence and
amount of community property, and 2) the appropriate amount and
duration of alimony.

The court will first address community

property.
COMMUNITY PROPERTY
Robert and Hope were married in California, but have lived
in Utah for over ten years.

Were it not for the Agreement this

court would probably apply Utah law in dividing their property,
which affords trial courts great latitude in considering the
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contributions of both parties to the accumulation of wealth
during the marriage.

The Agreement is lengthy and detailed.

The

Agreement provides that it is governed by California law.
A.

Alleged Breach

Hope maintains that the Agreement is not effective if either
party breaches any of its obligations thereunder.

She cites the

following language from paragraph 1 of the Agreement:
"The effectiveness of this Agreement is expressly
conditioned upon. . . each party's . . . performance
of the terms and conditions contained herein."
Hope maintains that Robert failed to perform the terms and
conditions of the Agreement by 1) failing to pay income taxes,
(2) failing to maintain insurance on Robert's life for Hope's
benefit, 3) failing to comply with the duty of good faith and
fair dealing implicit in every contract, and 4) failing to
fulfill his fiduciary duty to Hope.
breaches invalidate the Agreement.

She maintains that those
The court examines each

argument in turn.
A. 1.

Taxes

Paragraph 0. of the Agreement imposes on Robert the
obligation to report his income for the purposes of federal or
state income tax returns.

Hope maintains that the aggressive

deductions claimed on their past tax returns raise a question
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whether Robert has satisfied this obligation.

However, also in

paragraph 0., Robert promises to indemnify Hope against any
claims, assessment, deficiencies, interest, penalties, fees and
costs attributable to his income arising out of any filed tax
return.

This specific remedy is clearly the remedy Hope and

Robert agreed upon for possible failure to properly report
income, not the invalidation of the Agreement.
A. 2 .

Insurance

Paragraph P. of the Agreement imposes on Robert the
obligation to maintain $250,000 of life insurance on his life
naming Hope as beneficiary as long as they are married and living
together.

This obligation he has satisfied.

However,

subparagraph P.4. also requires Robert to notify Hope before
cancelling this insurance and to require his insurance company to
notify her ais well.

Robert admits he has cancelled that policy

since separaition without giving and requiring that notice. Hope
claims this invalidates the Agreement.
P.4.

However, subparagraph

provides a specific remedy for this failure - Robert's

estate essentially becomes an insurer of his life and must pay
$250,000 to Hope if he dies without insurance in force.

As with

the taxes, the specific remedy trumps the general remedy of
invalidating the Agreement.
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A. 3.

Good Faith and Fair Dealing

Hope argues that Robert violated his duty of good faith and
fair dealing by manipulating his activities, the financial
statements of his companies, and his receipt of salary from his
businesses to prevent the accumulation of community property.
Hope's claim that Robert must work in ways that create community
property is undermined by subparagraph F.2. of the Agreement,
which allows Robert to "pursue any vocation, occupation or
profession'' . Hope has also failed to persuade the court that
Robert manipulated any opportunity to receive salary.

It was

reasonable to work at the Resort without compensation as long as
the Resort was not profitable.

Even after profitability, it is

appropriate to wait until a return on investment is made before
paying a salary to Robert.

Finally, even though neither Robert

nor Hope received a salary from the Resort, each of them received
extensive and substantial benefits from living at the Resort.
A. 4. Fiduciary Duty
Hope claims that Robert violated his fiduciary duty to her.
However, the Agreement makes clear that Robert has a fiduciary
duty only when community property exists.
property exists, he has no duty.
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If no community

With all of these claims of a failure to perform, the court
would in any event be required to apply the rule that a contract
is not invalidated except for a substantial breach.

The court

rejects Hope's claims that the Agreement is invalid because
Robert did not perform his obligations thereunder.
Partnership
Although Hope has presented no agreement signed by Robert
which makes her a partner in any of his business enterprises, she
maintains that there is substantial evidence that he did in fact
make her a partner.

Her evidence includes her own testimony that

Robert talked to her on at least three occasions to tell her how
she must conduct herself as an "owner'7 . Robert denies these
conversations.

He maintains that he and Hope frequently argued

about her lack of ownership.

Hope also presented a clip of a

television program featuring the Resort which described her as a
"co-owner".

Several magazine articles featuring the Resort

referred to Hope as an "owner".

Finally, Hope presented the

testimony of Stuart Berman, the former lawyer of Robert in
California, who briefly shared an ownership interest in the
Resort with Robert in 1999.

Berman testified that all

discussions between him and Robert included the implicit
assumption that Hope was a "co-owner" of Robert's interest.
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The court is aware of no authority that creates a ownership
interest simply because third parties believe such ownership
exists.

The belief of those third parties could, under some

circumstances be sufficient evidence of ownership, but the
ownership would have to be created by agreement of the parties.
Subparagraph W. 2 of the Agreement expressly provides that the
use of "such expressions as 'our property', 'our house' or 'our
bank account'" does not alter the Agreement.

The Agreement

provides that community property comes into existence only as the
Agreement provides.

Paragraph D. 3. of the Agreement clearly

provides that separate property becomes community property only
if a document of title so indicates and the relinquishing party
clearly acknowledges the relinquishment of a one-half interest in
the property.
Stuart Berman's testimony is undermined by his obvious
anger at Robert, which persists even though he made $475,000 on
an investment of $1,721,000 in just eight months.

His testimony

is also seriously undermined by the actual language of the
agreements between Berman and Robert.

Hope signed only one of

those agreements, and only in the capacity of a consenting
spouse, which a careful lawyer from California would require when
dealing with a married man who insists his wife actually has no
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ownership interests.

It is obvious that Berman knew Hope was not

a co-owner.
Hope claims that her putative ownership interest in Levinius
is unaffected by the Agreement's requirement of a writing because
she asserts it against Levinius, not against Robert.
of course, is not a party to this action.

Levinius,

Robert is, and he is

entitled to the protection of the Agreement.

Hope's claim that

she became a partner by virtue of verbal agreements is rejected
because 1) the Agreement requires a written agreement to create a
partnership, and 2) her claims that a verbal agreement was made
are not credible.
The Meaning of "Earnings"
The court now turns to what it considers Hope's strongest
claim; that subparagraph F.3. of the Agreement provides that the
profits or cash flow from Flat Iron Mesa and/or the Resort, are
community property.
The Agreement reverses the presumption under California law
that any income resulting from the efforts of a husband or wife
during marriage, and any property acquired with that income, is
community property.

Instead, all income, and all property

acquired with that income, is separate property, unless the
Agreement otherwise provides.

Subparagraph D.l. of the Agreement
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provides that earnings are governed by paragraph F.

Subparagraph

F.1. of the Agreement provides that earnings from personal
services, skills, efforts, talents or work are separate property,
except as the Agreement specifically provides.

Subparagraph F.2.

of the Agreement creates a community property right in the
"earnings" or "base salary" derived from actual effort or
employment of Robert.

"Earnings" or "base salary" are defined as

compensation for labor or services performed by Robert, but not
including any benefits associated with the "earnings" or "base
salary".

The only earnings or base salary derived from actual

efforts of Robert were paid during the four months following the
marriage, were deposited in the joint account and promptly
consumed on community expenses.
Subparagraph F.4. defines the Kellwood payments, except
salary, as separate property.

Subparagraph F.5. provides a

community property right in bonuses received by Robert as an
employee under limited circumstances.

Subparagraph F.6. provides

an additional community property right in bonuses based on the
duration of the marriage.

Subparagraph F.7. provides a community

property right in pension payments based on longevity of the
marriage.

Subparagraph F.8. excludes any community property

participation in stock options or dividends.
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Subparagraph F.9.

provides that earnings or salary from joint business ventures
between Hope and Robert are community property, but joint
business ventures are established by written agreement.
Subparagraph F.10. makes all of Hope's earnings separate.
Paragraph I. of the Agreement provides that all profits,
rents, increase, appreciation and income from Robert's separate
property are also his property.

A change in the form of Robert's

separate property does not change the characterization of that
property.

If Robert sells separate property and purchases other

property, the new property is also separate property.

Paragraph

J. of the Agreement provides that devoting time, skills or effort
to separate property does not change it to community property.
Against this background, the court is asked to interpret
subparagraph F.3, which reads as follows:
"In the event ROBBIE enters into any type of
business venture or ventures from and after the
date of marriage from which ROBBIE will receive
earnings or salary therefrom (regardless of whether
such eairnings or salary have been derived from
actual effort or services performed by ROBBIE for
or on behalf of the business venture), such earnings
or salary, derived from business ventures or ventures,
shall be community property. For purposes of this
paragraph F.3., the term "earnings" or "salary"
derived from said business ventures or ventures
excludes pension and deferred income contributions,
stock, stock options, bonuses, benefits and rights,
and perquisites, which items shall remain ROBBIE'S separate
property subj ect to Paragraphs F.5, F.6. and F.7.
It is the parties intention that all property
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acquired with such "earnings" or "salary" (defined
under this Paragraph F.3.) shall be community
property unless the parties agree otherwise in writing."
Robert maintains that the words "salary" and "earnings" have
the same meaning in subparagraph F.3. as they had in subparagraph
F.2.

Hope, on the other hand, points out that the language that

followed "earnings" and "base salary" in F.2 were "derived from
actual effort or employment of ROBBIE", whereas the words that
follow "earnings" and "salary" in F.3. are "regardless of whether
such earnings or salary have been derived from actual effort or
services performed by ROBBIE".

Robert explains this as loosening

the requirement that Robert actually perform services for his
business venture to make his earnings or salary community
property, but maintains that "earnings" still have the customary
meaning under California law of payment received because of
services provided, as opposed to investments made.

Hope

maintains that both Flat Iron Mesa and the Resort are business
ventures entered into by Robert, and that any profits allocated
to Robert from those ventures are "earnings" that are community
property under F.3.
There is no question that, in the absence of the Agreement,
the profits of Flat Iron Mesa would be Robert's separate property
because the investment in Flat Iron Mesa was funded by Robert's
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separate property.

Hope made an effort to persuade the court

that Robert was actively involved in the management of Flat Iron
Mesa.

Even if the court were convinced of that, it was Robert's

money, not his business efforts, that made the Flat Iron Mesa
profits possible.

The Resort is a somewhat different situation;

Robert's investment in the Resort was critical to its success,
but his management was also a factor.
Reading the Agreement as a whole, particularly in view of
the portions of the Agreement described above, the court is
convinced that "earnings" in subparagraph F.3. means payments
based at least in theory on services, such as actual salary,
guaranteed payments to a member in a limited liability company,
or draws to a partner in an operating business partnership.

It

does not mean any kind of profits from a business venture.
Were the court to consider parol evidence, its finding about
the meaning of "earnings" would be the same.

Robert testified

that he always intended that Hope would participate primarily in
his base salary from employment and then in bonuses and pension
payments only under limited circumsyances.

He remembers

specifically discussing F.3. and understanding it to mean that
Hope would participate only in his wages, salary or similar
payments from any new businesses he may start.
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Hope's

recollection of specific provisions of the Agreement is virtually
non existent.

Her description of what she understood the

Agreement to mean was general and did not appear to be based on
actual memory of the language of the Agreement or advice of her
attorney concerning its meaning.

Moreover, Robert's

interpretation is more consistent with the overall expressed
purpose of the Agreement.

It is hard to believe that Robert went

to the trouble of obtaining a prenuptial agreement so he could
ensure that Hope would claim one-half of profits from any
business ventures in which he would become involved.
Because the parties presented evidence of what profits Flat
Iron Mesa and the Resort have realized, and because the court
expects that an appeal of this decision is likely, the court will
also analyze what Hope should receive if her interpretation of
F.3. is ultimately accepted.
A.

Flat Iron Mesa

Under California law community property ceases to accumulate
when the parties separate.
the Agreement.

This also appears to be the intent of

See subparagraph F.l. of the Agreement.

Hope and

Robert had certainly separated by the end of 2005, so Hope would
be entitled at most, to any profits of Flat Iron Mesa earned by
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the end of 2005.

Robert's share of profits from Flat Iron Mesa

was $476,609 in 2003, $294,465 in 2004, and $285,006 in 2005.
The court is not persuaded that Flat Iron Mesa was a
business venture within the meaning of F.3.
investment.

It was an

Robert contributed nothing of significance to Flat

Iron Mesa other than his money.

Any profits he received were

clearly unearned income.
B.

The Resort

If F.3. makes the profits of the Resort community property,
the court must decide whether the Resort had any profits.

From

its inception through the end of 2 005, the Resort had an
accumulated taxable loss of $2 million.
depreciation of $3.6 million.

It also had accumulated

Since depreciation does not

represent an expenditure of cash, Hope argues that accumulated
depreciation must be added to taxable income to calculate
operating cash flow, which is what she contends F.3. means by
"earnings."
The court recognizes that the reason the Resort has $3.6
million of accumulated depreciation is that Robert has invested
$11 million of his separate property and borrowed money in the
Resort.

The Resort was certainly not a cash cow through 2005.

Moreover, the court agrees with Robert's expert that, even if

17

depreciation does not represent an expenditure of cash, it does
represent an allowance for replacing wasting assets which wear
out and must eventually be replaced.

While it may be that the

depreciation allowance under U.S. tax laws is more generous than
would actually be required for replacing wasting assets, the
court does not agree that no allowance is required.

In the

absence of better information about an appropriate allowance, the
court falls back on that provided under U.S. tax law.
In all of this analysis, it is worth noting that Robert has
made enormous cash investments in the Resort, in addition to
devoting himself to making the Resort profitable.

Hope also

devoted herself to making the Resort profitable, but she made no
cash investment in the Resort.

Both Hope and Robert, though they

worked hard, enjoyed the amenities of the Resort and lived a
luxurious lifestyle.

Under Utah law, Hope is entitled to

sufficient alimony to preserve that lifestyle.

Under Utah law,

the court would properly award Hope only a small percentage, if
any, of the Resort.

Under California law, the Resort would

likely remain separate property of Robert, subject to possible
compensation of Hope for her contribution to its success.

Under

the Agreement, interpreting F.3. as Hope desires, Hope would be
entitled only to one-half of accumulated profits received by
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Robert, less one half of those profits applied to community
expenses.

The only distributions to Robert from the Resort were

in 2003 and 2005, and totaled about $280,000.

Thus, the most

community property Hope would be entitled to is $140,000, reduced
by community expenses over the course of the marriage.

She has

already received a voluntary property settlement from Robert of
over $100,000.
For the reasons set forth above the court determines that
there is no community property to divide.
Alimony
Robert maintains that Hope is entitled to no more than
$10,000 per month alimony.

Hope seeks $30,000 per month.

Since

Robert has stipulated that he can afford any reasonable alimony
award, the only question is what amount of alimony will maintain
Hope in the lifestyle to which she was accustomed during the
marriage.
The parties spent about $9,000 per month on Hope's expenses
before separation. After separation, Hope spent about $10,500 per
month.

Hope's expert witness presented a proposed budget that

amounted, in many ways, to combining pre-separation and postseparation expenses.

His argument was that the pre-separation

expenses were basically for luxuries and that Hope's necessities
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were provided as an incident to her residence at the Resort.
After separation, Hope's witness testified, Hope eliminated most
luxuries and spent her temporary alimony on necessities.

Thus,

to restore her marital standard of living, Hope would need
$19,707 per month.

Her expert added to this figure about $5,000

per month for income taxes, and $6,800 per month to purchase an
additional residence for about $1 million.

Thus, Hope demands

alimony of $30,000 per month.
The court does not fully agree with the budget Robert
proposes for Hope.

For example, Robert proposes to reduce Hope's

allowance for medical treatments not covered by insurance - a
category that historically included laser treatment and plastic
surgery - to an amount that would cover only deductibles and copayments for medically necessary procedures.

Regardless of how

Robert feels or felt about the necessity of plastic surgery, the
evidence at trial clearly established that maintaining her
appearance with surgical and similar procedures was a routine
part of life for Hope.
Robert also argues that Hope should be expected to work
outside the home.

However, the evidence was clear that Hope

worked only at the Resort.

Even there, it was necessary to hire
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housekeepers and nannies to take care of the residence and Calli
Jo when Hope worked at the Resort.
On the other hand, the court does not agree with Hope that
she must have a housekeeper/nanny to match her marital standard
of living.

Since she no longer has duties at the Resort, she

should be able to maintain the property where she now lives
without the need to hire any employees.

This will not cause her

to work any harder than she did during the marriage.
The most difficult challenge for the court is to approximate
the cost of elements of Hope's marital life that were not purely
economic.

How can a court make available all of the amenities

provided at the Resort?

How is the court to value the apparent

perquisite Hope enjoyed of being able to buy almost anything she
wanted and go anywhere she wanted?

Once Hope separated from

Robert, she no longer had any access to his substantial monetary
reserves.
alimony.

This is something the court cannot replace with
However, it is possible, by looking at historic

expenditures, to approximate what monthly payment will enable
Hope to enjoy the standard of living she enjoyed during the
marriage.
The court starts with the budget proposed by Hope's expert,
Richard Hoffman ("Hoffman").

The court disagrees with Hoffman

21

that the $5,000 of "mad money" Robert gave Hope each of the last
few months before separation represents any effort to match
historic expenditures.

Hoffman substituted the $5,000 for $1800

of documented pre-separation monthly expenditures.
accordingly reduces Hoffman's budget by $3,200.

The court

The court is

also unpersuaded that Hope needs a second marital residence worth
$1 million to match her marital lifestyle.

As best this court

can determine, her present residence is similar in appearance and
quality to the place she lived at the Resort.
Robert also challenges Hope's proposed "barn expenses" of
$2,100 per month.

Hope has taken her horses to her new home,

where she has a barn to house them.

Based on actual expenditures

for horses at the Resort, sometimes including these same horses,
Robert maintains that $400 per month is sufficient.

The court

agrees that Hope has overstated these projected expenses, but
also agrees that there were economies of scale at the Resort that
Hope may not now enjoy.

The court's best estimate of "barn

expenses" is $600 per month.
Hope includes $550 per month in her budget for private
school tuition for Calli Jo.

Whether Calli Jo will need or want

to attend private school is something no one presently knows.
Moreover, her tuition would not properly be treated as alimony,
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but rather as child support.

The court accordingly eliminates

this from Hope's proposed budget.
Finally, the court eliminates the budget allocated for
"savings" of $1,150 per month.

As far as this court can

determine, the purpose of alimony is to permit the maintenance of
a marital standard of living for a specified period after the end
of the marriage, not to allow the setting aside of a nest egg to
maintain the marriage partner thereafter.

Nothing in the

evidence suggests that Robert regularly set aside anything like
$1,150 per month for Hope's retirement during the marriage.
With these adjustments the court finds that Hope will
require $12,000 per month after taxes to maintain her marital
standard of living.

The tax burden for alimony at this level has

not been calculated by either expert.

Robert's expert estimated

that the combined federal and state tax burden on $10,000 of
monthly alimony was 19.1%.

Hope's expert estimated that the

combined federal and state burden on $24,500 of month alimony was
about 20%.

Monthly alimony before taxes of $15,000 should yield

$12,000 per month after taxes.

The court awards Hope alimony of

$15,000 per month.
Permanency of Alimony
Because Hope and Robert were married fourteen years and
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three months before separation, the maximum duration of alimony
is presumptively fourteen years and three months.

Alimony

usually terminates on remarriage or cohabitation.

Hope argues

that special circumstances - her loss of a potentially rewarding
career as a model and actress - warrant making this alimony nonterminable.

It is hard to imagine something more speculative

than the future film or modeling career of someone who has not
achieved "star" or "super model" status.

However, the Agreement

does authorize this court to consider Hope's career as a factor
in any aspect of alimony.
In order to permit Hope to make a gradual adjustment to a
different lifestyle if she should decide to remarry, as well as a
cushion towards establishing a new career, the decree will
provide that alimony will last for at least five years even if
Hope remarries or cohabits, and that it shall continue
thereafter, even with remarriage or cohabitation, at a reduced
level of $7,500 per month, for five more years.

In other words,

if Hope remarries or cohabits before October 1, 2012, alimony
will not be reduced or eliminated until October 1, 2012, when it
will be reduced to $7,500 per month.

If she remarries after

October 1, 2012, but before October 1, 2017, it will be reduced
to $7,500 until October 1, 2017, when it will be eliminated.
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Remarriage or cohabitation after October 1, 2017, will cause an
immediate elimination of alimony.

Child Support
Hope and Robert have agreed on child support of $1,000 per
month.

If the parties determine that Calli Jo should attend

private school, Robert shall pay reasonable tuition.
Attorney Fees
There are two attorney fee issues in this case; first,
whether Hope should be required to reimburse Robert for all or
part of the fees he advanced for her and second, whether either
party has prevailed in a dispute arising out of the terms,
conditions and obligations imposed by the Agreement, and is
therefore entitled to recover attorney fees under paragraph Z. of
the Agreement.
With respect to the first issue, the court promised, when it
originally required Robert to pay Hope's attorney fees, that it
may require her to reimburse him.

It was important to ensure

that Hope had an opportunity to present her best case to the
court and that she not be overwhelmed by Robert's resources.
Hope incurred litigation expenses of $120,000 through June 30,
2007.

Robert had paid $80,000 of those fees and disputed
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$40,000.

At the close of trial, the court instructed Robert to

pay those fees.

Through August 28, 2007, Robert had incurred

litigation expenses of $124,000 just in securing a determination
of the validity and enforcement of the Agreement.

The court is

unable to say that Hope's fees are unreasonable in amount when
they are less than Robert's fees.

Also, even though the court

ultimately found for Robert on the property issues, the court
cannot find that Hope's position was so untenable that she should
be required to cover her own fees.
The theory on which Utah law permits a court to require one
party to a divorce to advance the fees of the other is to permit
each side an equal opportunity to present its case. Hope did not
have the resources to match Robert's effort without assistance.
However, she did have approximately $35,000 in her securities
account from gifts Robert made during the course of the marriage.
The court should have required her to use that account at least
in substantial part.

The court will require that Hope pay

$30,000 of her own fees, plus whatever amount her fees since June
30, 2007, exceed $3 0,000.

In other words, Robert shall not be

required to pay any litigation expense incurred by Hope after
June 30, 2007, and, if those expenses are less than $30,000, the
difference shall be refunded to Robert.
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With respect to paragraph Z. of the Agreement, the court
finds that Robert- is the prevailing^ party in the dispute "arising
out of the terms, conditions and obligations imposed by" the
Agreement.

Hope's claims for community property were based first

on her effort to invalidate the Agreement, second on her claim
that she was a co-owner of the Resort, and third, that she was
entitled to one-half of Robert's distributions from Flat Iron
Mesa and one-half of the "operating cash flow' of the Resort.
Given the disposition of all those claims, this court cannot
consider Hope the prevailing party in the aspects of this dispute
that involved the Agreement.

Robert is the prevailing party.

In accordance with paragraph Z. of the Agreement, the court
must award Robert his fees in connection with the dispute over
the application of the Agreement.
the end of trial.

He claims $167,884.75 through

Those services were necessary and the charges

therefor were reasonable.

The court awards Robert his fees of

$167,884.75.
Robert may recover his fees only by deducting $5,000 from
each month's alimony payment.

The award of fees shall bear

interest at 6.99% per annum from October 1, 2 007.
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Counsel for Robert should submit findings, conclusions and a
decree pursuant to Rule 7, URCP.
Dated this

day of September, 2007.

&

QwJljU*i}-^,

Lyle R. Anderson, D i s t r i c j t

Judge

-SfefeftK/QEPUTY CLERK
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EXHIBIT 4

PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT

THIS PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT (the "Agreement") is made and
entered into th is

/ < - day of

(^

A ^

, 1991, in the

City of Los Angeles, County of Los Angeles, State of California,
by and between HOPE MARIE RIZZITANO (hereinafter referred to as
"HOPE") and ROBERT LEVIN (hereinafter referred to as "ROBBIE"),
with reference to the following facts:
1.

This Agreement is entered into in consideration of

marriage and the promises contained herein.

The effectiveness of

this Agreement is expressly conditioned upon such marriage
between the parties actually taking place and each party's
subsequent performance of the terms and conditions contained
herein.

If, for any reason, the marriage does not take place,

this Agreement will be of no force or effect.
2.

ROBBIE has been previously married and divorced,

and has one son, PAUL LEVIN, age 20.

HOPE has not been

previously married and has no children.
3.

The parties hereto desire and do hereby define the

respective rights of each in the property, income, assets, and
liabilities that each may have or may thereafter acquire, and the
parties agree that, except as may expressly be set forth herein,
all property, real and personal, owned by either of them at the
time of the contemplated marriage, from whatever source,
including any growth in the value of said property, whether or
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not due to the efforts of one or both of the parties during the
marriage, shall be and remain the separate property of the person
who initially owned or subsequently acquired the property, and
neither shall acquire any interest or right to any of the
property of the other.
4.

ROBBIE has substantially disclosed to HOPE, by the

attached Exhibit "A11, the nature, extent and value of his
property interests, including, without limitation, his various
present business and investment interests and his present and
potential income from various sources, including without
limitation, his business and investment interests.

The parties

acknowledge that the total value of ROBBIE f s property interests
is estimated to be in excess of $10,000,000.00.
5.

HOPE has substantially disclosed to ROBBIE, by the

attached Exhibit

M

B " , the nature, extent and value of her

property interests, including, without limitation, her various
present business and investment interests and her present and
potential income from various sources, including, without
limitation, her business and investment interests.

The parties

acknowledge that the total value of HOPE'S property interests is
estimated to be in excess of $
6.

.

HOPE and ROBBIE acknowledge to each other that

each does not now have, possess, or claim any rights or interest
in the present or future income, property, or assets of the
other, except as hereinafter specifically provided for.
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NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, and of
the terms, covenants, and conditions herein contained, the
parties hereto agree to the following:
A.

BINDING AGREEMENT
HOPE f s and ROBBIE f s rights with respect to the property

owned by either of them at the time of the contemplated marriage
or acquired during marriage to each other shall be subject to the
terms of this Agreement.
B.

DISCLOSURE OF PROPERTY
1.

At the time this Agreement is executed, ROBBIE

sets forth in Exhibit "A", attached hereto and by this reference
incorporated herein, substantially all real and personal property
in which he has an interest and the extent of that interest, and
any other resources or means of support.
2.

At the time this Agreement is executed, HOPE sets

forth in Exhibit

fl M

B , attached hereto and by this reference

incorporated herein, substantially all real and personal property
in which she has an interest and the extent of that interest, and
any other resources or means of support.
3.

At the time this Agreement is executed, ROBBIE

sets forth in Exhibit

M ff

C , attached hereto and by this reference

incorporated herein, substantially all obligations for which he
is liable.
4.

At the time this Agreement is executed, HOPE sets

forth in Exhibit
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incorporated herein, substantially all obligations for which she
is liable.
5.

The foregoing disclosures are for courtesy only

and not an inducement to enter into this Agreement.

ROBBIE and

HOPE agree that each is willing to enter into this Agreement
freely and voluntarily regardless of the nature, extent or total
amount of the present or future assets, liabilities, income or
expenses of the other, and each party voluntarily and expressly
waives hereto any right to disclosure of the property and/or
obligations of the other party beyond the disclosures provided in
this Agreement.
C.

REPRESENTATION BY INDEPENDENT COUNSEL
HOPE acknowledges that she has been represented by

independent counsel, FLYNN, KNERR & OYLER by CONNOLLY OYLER,
ESQ., and ROBBIE acknowledges that he has been represented by
independent counsel, SIMKE, CHODOS, SILBERFELD & ANTEAU, INC. by
RONALD W. ANTEAU, ESQ., in preparation of this Agreement; that
counsel representing each party is of his or her own choosing;
and that this Agreement has been read by the parties and that its
meaning and legal consequence have been explained fully to them
by their counsel and are understood.
D.

PROPERTIES OF EACH SPOUSE THAT ARE TO REMAIN SEPARATE
1.

ROBBIE and HOPE agree that all property, including

the property set forth in Exhibit "A11, belonging to ROBBIE at the
commencement of the marriage shall remain his separate property.
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ROBBIE shall have sole management and control over the property,
and the property shall be subject to his disposition as his
separate property in the same manner as if no marriage had been
entered into.

All earnings of ROBBIE during the marriage shall

be characterized as defined hereinbelow and as more fully set
forth in Paragraph F. below.
2.

HOPE and ROBBIE agree that all property, including

the property set forth in Exhibit

,! !f

B , belonging to HOPE at the

commencement of the marriage shall remain her separate property.
HOPE shall have sole management and control over the property,
and the property shall be subject to her disposition as her
separate property in the same manner as if no marriage had been
entered into.

All earnings of HOPE during the marriage shall be

characterized as defined hereinbelow and as more fully set forth
in Paragraph F. below.
3.

Without this Agreement, the parties acknowledge

that property acquired during marriage in California could be
categorized as community property.

Community property is defined

by Civil Code, §687, which states, "Community property is
property sicquired by husband and wife, or either, during
marriage, when not acquired as the separate property of either,"
and by Section 5110, which states, "except as provided in
Sections 5107, 5108, and 5126, all real property situated in this
state and all personal property wherever situated acquired during
the marriage by a married person while domiciled in this state
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and property held in trust pursuant to Section 5110.150, is
community property...".

The parties acknowledge and agree that

they understand and are aware of the fact that under community
property law, each would be entitled to a one-half (1/2) interest
in the property and income of the other when same is acquired
under the definition of community property.

ROBBIE and HOPE

understand and agree that, by this Agreement, there shall be no
community property and that all assets, no matter when acquired,
shall be the sole and separate property of the party so acquiring
it unless specifically designated otherwise in this Agreement
and/or on a document of title contrary to the terms of this
Agreement, and each party acknowledges that he or she is
relinquishing a one-half (1/2) interest in property or income
acquired by the other party as a direct result.

Notwithstanding

anything to the contrary stated above or below in this Agreement,
the parties desire to and do retain the right to purchase and
take title to property (real and personal) as joint tenants or
tenants-in-common or community property if so designated on a
document of title.
Each party waives any right of management and
control over the separate property of the other party and
acknowledges that there is no fiduciary duty with respect to each
spouse's management and control over the separate property in
relation to the other spouse.

The parties further acknowledge

that, without this Agreement, there could be rights of joint
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management and control of the community personal property, if
any, as well as a fiduciary duty that each spouse act in good
faith with respect to the other spouse in the management and
control of the community property.

Each party acknowledges that

he or she understands that, except for the community property or
joint property" rights created or reserved under this Agreement,
which rights and claims remain governed by Civil Code, §5125, et
sea.,

each waives all rights pertaining to joint management and

control of the community property, if any, as well as the duty to
act in good faith with respect to same, and all rights and claims
against the other for breach of fiduciary duty and/or for an
accounting of the property and obligations, pursuant to Civil
Code, §5125, et seg.
f.

MUTUAL WAIVER OF MARVIN V, MARVIN CLAIMS
1.

HOPE might be entitled to receive compensation

based upon reasonable value of services rendered by her to ROBBIE
during the non-marital relationship of the parties.

HOPE hereby

agrees that, notwithstanding the expenditures of her time, skill
and effort during the non-marital relationship for which she
might be entitled to receive compensation, HOPE waives all rights
and claims to receive such compensation for services rendered by
her including any rights which may inure to her after the
effective date of this Agreement through the date of the parties 1
marriage.

HOPE expressly waives any right or claims she may have

under the case of Marvin v. Marvin.
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Notwithstanding the fact that ROBBIE might have
voluntarily provided HOPE with support or maintenance during the
non-marital relationship of the parties, such conduct shall not
be construed as an agreement, either express or implied, to
provide HOPE with support or maintenance.
2.

ROBBIE might be entitled to receive compensation

based upon reasonable value of services rendered by him to HOPE
during the non-marital relationship of the parties.

ROBBIE

hereby agrees that, notwithstanding the expenditures of his time,
skill and effort during the non-marital relationship for which he
might be entitled to receive compensation, ROBBIE waives all
rights and claims to receive such compensation for services
rendered by him including any rights which may inure to him after
the effective date of this Agreement through the date of the
parties1 marriage.

ROBBIE expressly waives any right or claims

he may have under the case of Marvin v. Marvin, supra.
Notwithstanding the fact that HOPE might have
voluntarily provided ROBBIE with support or maintenance during
the non-marital relationship of the parties, such conduct shall
not be construed as an agreement, either express or implied, to
provide ROBBIE with support or maintenance.
F.

PROPERTIES OF EACH SPOUSE THAT ARE TO BE COMMUNITY
1.

Without this Agreement, the parties acknowledge

that all earnings or income resulting from the personal services,
skills, efforts, talent, or work of the parties during the time
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that they are married and living together could be categorized as
community property under California law.

ROBBIE and HOPE

understand and agree that, by this Agreement, any earnings or
income resulting from the personal services, skills, efforts,
talents, or work of each of the parties during the time they are
married and living together, and any property acquired therewith,
shall be and remain the separate property of the party whose
personal services, skills, efforts, talent, or work result in
such earnings or income, except as set forth hereinbelow.
2.

Except as otherwise expressly provided in this

Agreement, ROBBIE and HOPE understand and agree that the
"earnings" or "base salary", or accumulations from such earnings
or salary, derived from actual effort or employment of ROBBIE,
from and after the date of marriage, shall be community property.
For purposes of this paragraph, the terms "base salary" or
"earnings" are defined as compensation for labor or services
performed by ROBBIE, excluding pension and deferred
contributions, stock, stock options, bonuses, benefits and
rights, and perquisites, received by ROBBIE from his employment,
which items shall remain ROBBIE'S separate property.

It is the

parties' intention that all property acquired with such community
property earnings of ROBBIE shall be community property, unless
the parties agree otherwise in writing.

In this regard, the

parties specifically acknowledge and agree that ROBBIE is fully
free during the course of the marriage to pursue any vocation,
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occupation or profession, and nothing herein shall limit ROBBIE
in this regard.
3.

In the event ROBBIE enters into any type of

business venture or ventures from and after the date of marriage
from which ROBBIE will receive earnings or salary therefrom
(regardless of whether such earnings or salary have been derived
from actual effort or services performed by ROBBIE for or on
behalf of the business venture), such earnings or salary, or
accumulations from such earnings or salary, derived from said
business venture or ventures, shall be community property.

For

purposes of this paragraph F.3., the term "earnings11 or "salary"
derived from said business venture or ventures excludes pension
and deferred income contributions, stock, stock options, bonuses,
benefits and rights, and perquisites, which items shall remain
ROBBIE'S separate property subject to Paragraphs F.5., F.6. and
F.7.

It is the parties1 intention that all property acquired

with such "earnings" or "salary" (defined under this Paragraph
F.3.) shall be community property unless the parties agree
otherwise in writing.
4.

In regard to ROBBIE'S relationship with Kellwood,

the parties acknowledge that the earn out which ROBBIE is
receiving from Kellwood, which continues through December 31,
1993, is, and shall be, ROBBIE'S separate property.

Same shall

not be taken into consideration in any manner regarding ROBBIE'S
earnings, salary, or accumulations from such earnings or salary.
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5.

The parties wish to create a community property

participation in ROBBIEfs separate property earnings which are
related to bonuses which ROBBIE receives from his employment.

In

this regard, the parties are differentiating between four (4)
different circumstances, those being circumstances wherein (a)
ROBBIE is employed as an employee in the same industry (i.e., the
clothing industry); (b) ROBBIE is employed as an employee in a
business area outside the clothing industry; (c) ROBBIE is
rendering services to a corporation in which he is a principal
shareholder (owning ten percent (10%) or more of the stock) and
is being compensated for said efforts; and, (d) ROBBIE is
rendering services on behalf of a corporation in which he owns
less than ten percent (10%) of the stock therein, and he is being
compensated for said efforts.

In each of these instances, the

parties have entered into an agreement as to the community's
participation in monies derived by ROBBIE over and above the
earnings and/or base salary as set forth in Paragraphs F.2. and
F.3.

above.

The parties1 agreement in regard to each of these

alternatives are:
a.

ROBBIE will be entitled to receive, as his

separate property, any bonus up to five (5) times a multiple of
his salary, and any amount in excess thereof shall be community
property.

(The separate property aspect of the bonus is subject

to the community property participation therein as hereinafter
set forth in Paragraph F.6.)
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By way of example (for illustration only and
with no representation that such sums will be earned), if ROBBIE
has a salary of $300,000.00, and receives a bonus of
$2,000,000.00., ROBBIE shall be entitled to a separate property
interest in the bonus of a multiple of five (5) times the salary,
i.e., $300,000.00 in salary, $1,500,000.00 in bonus, and the
balance thereof, $500,000.00, shall be community property.
b.

ROBBIE will be entitled to a separate

property interest in a bonus of a multiple of three (3) times his
salary, with the balance of the bonus, if any, being community
property.

(The separate property aspect of the bonus is subject

to the community property participation therein as hereinafter
set forth in Paragraph F.6.)
By way of example (for illustration only and
with no representation that such sums will be earned), if ROBBIE
has a salary of $300,000.00 and receives a bonus of $2,000,000.00
ROBBIE will be entitled to a separate property interest in the
bonus of three (3) times the salary, i.e., $900,000.00, with the
balance thereof of $1,100,000.00 being community property. (Total
earnings of $2,300,000.00; Salary: $300,000.00, separate property
bonus: $900,000.00,
e.

community property bonus: $ 1 , 1 0 0 f 0 0 0 . 0 0 . )
ROBBIE will be entitled to receive, as his

separate property, any bonus up to five (5) times a multiple of
his salary, and any amount in excess thereof shall be community
property.
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to the community property participation therein as hereinafter
set forth in Paragraph F.6.)
By way of example (for illustration only and
with no representation that such sums will be earned), if ROBBIE
has a salary of $3 00,000.00, and receives a bonus of
$2,000,000.00., ROBBIE shall be entitled to a separate property
interest in the bonus of a multiple of five (5) times the salary,
i.e., $300,000.00 in salary, $1,500,000.00 in bonus, and the
balance thereof, $500,000.00, shall be community property.
d.

ROBBIE will be entitled to a separate

property interest in a bonus of a multiple of three (3) times his
salary, with the balance of the bonus, if any, being community
property.

(The separate property aspect of the bonus is subject

to the community property participation therein as hereinafter
set forth in Paragraph F.6.)
By way of example (for illustration only and
with no representation that such sums will be earned), if ROBBIE
has a salary of $300,000.00 and receives a bonus of $2,000,000.00
ROBBIE will be entitled to a separate property interest in the
bonus of three (3) times the salary, i.e., $900,000.00, with the
balance tliereof of $1,100, 000. 00 being community property. (Total
earnings of $2,300,000.00; Salary: $300,000.00, separate property
bonus: $900,000.00, community property bonus: $1,100,000.00.)
e.

Any bonus received by ROBBIE from Kellwood is

excluded from the provisions of Paragraphs F.5.a. through F.5.d.
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(as more specifically set forth in Paragraph F.4. above).
6.

In addition to the participation hereinabove set

forth, the community shall participate in ROBBIE'S separate
property bonus at a rate of five percent (5%) per year,
commencing December 31, 1992, and continuing at a rate of five
percent (5%) per year for each full year the parties are married
thereafter, not to exceed the community having a maximum of a
fifty percent (50%) interest in the separate property bonus,
(i.e. at the maximum point in time, any interest in the separate
property bonus would be fifty percent (50%) ROBBIE'S separate
property and fifty percent (50%) community property, which would
occur at the earliest for the year December 31, 2001).
By way of example, at the end of 1992, as in the
hypothetical set forth in Paragraph F.5.a. above, the community
would be entitled to receive five percent (5%) of the
hypothetical separate property bonus of $2,000,000.00

(i.e.,

$100,000.00).
7.

Additionally, as to any pension and/or deferred

compensation that ROBBIE will be receiving as a result of the
employment situations hereinabove set forth, the community shall
be entitled to share in said pension and/or deferred compensation
at a rate of five percent (5%) per year, commencing December 31,
1992, and continuing at a rate of five percent (5%) per year for
each full year the parties are married thereafter, not to exceed
the community having a maximum of a fifty percent (50%) interest
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in the separate property pension and/or deferred compensation,
(i.e. at the maximum point in time, any interest in the separate
property pension and/or deferred compensation contributions would
be fifty percent (50%) ROBBIE'S separate property and fifty
percent (50%) community property, which would occur at the
earliest for the year December 31, 2001).
8.

At no time will the community have any interest of

any kind in any stock options and/or dividends that arise as a
result of any of ROBBIE'S employment, as hereinabove set forth.
9.

In the event the parties enter into any type of

joint business venture or ventures from and after the date of
marriage, the earnings or salary, or accumulations from such
earnings or salary, derived from said joint business venture or
ventures, shall be community property.

For purpose of this

paragraph, the parties understand and agree that a joint business
venture will be established where the parties have entered into a
written agreement to establish same.

The parties understand and

agree that they will share equally all benefits derived from said
joint business venture or ventures (including earnings, salary,
accumulations from such earnings or salary, stock, stock options,
and perquisites), and all

liabilities and obligations

related

thereto.
10.

ROBBIE and HOPE understand and agree that except

as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any earnings, or income
resulting from the personal services, skills, efforts, talent, or
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work of HOPE during the time that HOPE and ROBBIE are married and
living together and any property acquired therewith, shall be and
remain the separate property of HOPE.
G.

MUTUAL WAIVERS
1.

Except as otherwise provided in Paragraph F.

hereinabove of this Agreement, all property of any kind or
nature, including but not limited to the earnings, income and
other distributions of any kind or nature, resulting from
personal services, skill, effort, management and work by either
party after the marriage shall be the separate property of the
party so acquiring said property and shall be subject in the same
manner as though the proposed marriage never had been entered
into.

Each party acknowledges that he or she understands that,

except for this Agreement, all of the earnings, income and other
distributions resulting from the personal services, skill,
effort, management and work of the acquiring party after the
marriage, would be community property but that, by this
Agreement, only certain earnings, income and other distributions
are made the separate property of the party acquiring said
earnings and income.
2.

Except as may otherwise be provided in this

Agreement, each of the parties hereto shall have an immediate
right to dispose of, transfer in any manner, or bequeath by Will,
his or her respective interest in and to (i) any and all property
belonging to him or her prior to the effective date hereof, (ii)
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any separcite property hereafter acquired, and (iii) his or her
respective share of any community and quasi-community property
hereafter acquired.

Without limiting the generality of the

foregoingr and subject to any contrary provisions of this
Agreement and/or subject to the execution of a valid Will,
confirmed by Codicil or republished subsequent to the effective
date of this Agreement, ROBBIE and HOPE hereby waive, discharge
and release any and all right, claim or interest, whether actual,
inchoate, or contingent, in law and equity, that he or she might
acquire in the separate property or community of the other by
reason of the proposed marriage, including, without limitation:
a.

The rights or claims of Dower, Curtesy, or

any statutory or common law substitutes for one party's right to
an interest in the other party1s property provided by the
statutes of the State of California or any other state in which
the parties may die, be domiciled or in which they own real
property;
b.

The right of election to take against the

Will of the other;
c.

The right to act as executor and/or

administrator of the estate of the other, except in the event
that the deceased dies intestate;
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The right to a family allowance;

e.

The right to a probate homestead;

f.

The right to have exempt property set aside;
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g.

The right to a distributive share of the

estate of the other should he or she die intestate (including
such property that would otherwise be community property but for
this Agreement); and,
h.

The right to take the statutory share of an

omitted spouse.
H.

WILLS
1.

Any pre-existing Will, testament, or trust

instrument, or any other instrument which disposes of the estate
of the other in death, shall remain in full force and effect, and
shall not be revoked in whole or part by the occurrence of the
marriage.

Each party specifically waives the benefit of all

probate or other similar statutes which might be in existence
with respect to revocation of Wills on marriage, including
without limitation, California Probate Code, §6560, and similar
statutes in other jurisdictions.
2.

Nothing contained herein shall constitute a waiver

by either party of any bequest or devise that the other party may
choose to make to him or her by Will or Codicil after the
execution of this Agreement.
that, except as

However, the parties acknowledge

otherwise provided for herein, no promises of any

kind have been made by either of them about any such bequest or
devise.
Additionally, both parties acknowledge that there
have been no oral representations of any kind as to any right or
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any interest in the other's estate, now or in the future, whether
by way of Will, trust, or any other form of bequest, nor has
there been any oral promise or any other oral representation that
any such right or interest shall be provided as a part of or in
consideration of the entering into this Prenuptial Agreement.
I.

PROFITS FROM SEPARATE PROPERTY
1.

The parties agree that all rents, issues, profits,

increase, appreciation and income from the separate property of
ROBBIE, whether real or personal, shall remain his separate
property.

The parties agree that a change in the form of

ROBBIE'S separate property shall not constitute a change of
characterization, and the separate property shall remain ROBBIE'S
separate property regardless of any change in form.

By way of

illustration only, if ROBBIE sells one of his separate properties
and deposits the proceeds from the sale in a bank account, that
bank account will remain ROBBIE'S separate property; if ROBBIE
uses the payments he receives on a note secured by a deed of
trust to invest in a business, that business, together with all
of its assets, tangible and intangible, will remain ROBBIE'S
separate property; if ROBBIE purchases an apartment building with
his separate assets, the new apartment building will remain
ROBBIE'S separate property.
2.

The parties agree that all rents, issues, profits,

increase, appreciation and income from the separate property of
HOPE, whether real or personal, shall remain her separate

AGRFI101.LEV

19

property.

The parties agree that a change in the form of HOPE'S

separate property shall not constitute a change in
characterization, and the separate property shall remain HOPE'S
separate property regardless of any change in form.

The

illustration set forth in Paragraph 1.1. above is incorporated
herein by reference.
J.

EFFECT OF TIME, SKILL AND EFFORT
1.

The parties agree that ROBBIE may devote

considerable time, skill and effort to the investment and
management of his separate property and the income from it.

The

parties agree that, notwithstanding that the expenditure of
ROBBIE'S time, skill and effort might constitute a community
interest or asset in the absence of this Agreement which would
otherwise entitle HOPE to one-half (1/2) thereof, there shall not
be any community interest from the expenditure of ROBBIE'S time,
skill, and effort on his separate property, and any rents,
issues, profits, increase, appreciation and income from the
separate property of ROBBIE shall remain the separate property of
ROBBIE.
2.

The parties agree that HOPE may devote

considerable time, skill and effort to the investment and
management of her separate property and the income from it.

The

parties agree that, notwithstanding that the expenditure of
HOPE'S time, skill and effort might constitute a community
interest or asset in the absence of this Agreement which would
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otherwise entitle ROBBIE to one-half (1/2) thereof, there shall
not be any community interest from the expenditure of HOPE'S
time, skill and effort on her separate property, and any rents,
issues, profits, increase, appreciation and income from the
separate property of HOPE shall remain the separate property of
HOPE.
3.

The expenditure of time, effort, skill and money

by one party for the benefit of the separate property of the
other party shall be deemed to be a gift to the other unless
otherwise agreed to in writing.
K.

WAIVER OF INTEREST IN GOODWILL
Each party acknowledges that the other, by virtue of

his or her career development before marriage and during the term
of the marriage, may have acquired or may acquire a factor of
goodwill (or any analogous or comparable factor, however
described) in his or her profession, practice or other business
entity or entities, and may increase or decrease the value during
the marriage.

Each party hereby agrees that any such goodwill

(or analogous) factor is and shall remain the separate property
of the party in whose profession, practice or business entity the
goodwill exists, and that any

increase or decrease in such

goodwill factor during the term of the marriage, shall not
effect, and shall not be considered in determining, the parties 1
marital property rights pursuant to the laws of the State of
California, or pursuant to the provisions of this Agreement.
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L.

EFFECT OF COMMINGLING
The occurrence of commingling or otherwise failing to

segregate the separate property or separate income of either
party shall neither change nor constitute a change in the
character of that property, nor shall it constitute a
transmutation of that separate property or income into community,
quasi-community, joint marital, or similar type of property.
M.

REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY
1.

Any personal property acquired by the parties

jointly hereafter (defined as an acquisition where title is taken
in both parties 1 names, or where the parties sign a writing as to
the joint nature of such acquisition), shall be owned by them as
tenants-in-common or joint tenants or community property, as the
parties then so decide, each party holding an undivided one-half
(1/2) interest.
2.

Any motor vehicles, trailers, boats or other items

of personal property subject to registration and certificates of
ownership by the State of California or other states, countries
or jurisdictions, shall be the property of the person whose name
is shown as the registered owner on the certificate of ownership,
and if title is taken in both names, or where the parties sign a
writing as to the joint nature of such acquisition, shall be
owned by them as tenants-in-common or joint tenants or community
property, as the parties then so decide, each party holding an
undivided one-half (1/2) interest.
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3.

Any real property acquired by the parties jointly

in California or any other state hereafter shall be owned by each
as tenants-in-common or joint tenants or community property as
the parties so decide, each party holding an interest according
to title.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the event the

parties jointly purchase a residence and/or income property,
(defined as an acquisition where title is taken in both parties1
names or where the parties make a writing as to the joint nature
of such acquisition) , where title or a writing does not set forth
a disproportionate interest, although the parties make no
promises to do so, if either ROBBIE or HOPE contributes more than
his or her equal share toward the down payment, reduction of
principal on mortgage payments, or improvements, then the party
contributing more than his or her equal share shall retain a
right of reimbursement pursuant to Civil Code, §4800.2, from the
net sale proceeds of the property.

For purposes herein, "net

sale proceeds" is defined as gross cash sale proceeds less all
costs associated with the sale of the property, including
brokers1 fees, the payment of all liens and encumbrances against
said property, and the payment of all appropriate taxes.

By way

of illustration only,

percent

if ROBBIE contributes one hundred

(100%) toward the down payment, reduction of principal or
mortgage payments and/or improvements, then ROBBIE shall retain a
right of reimbursement for one hundred percent (100%) of his
contribution (representing the excess contribution) directly from
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the net sale proceeds of the property; if ROBBIE contributes
eighty percent (80%) and HOPE contributes twenty percent (20%)
toward the down payment, reduction of principal on mortgage,
and/or improvements, then ROBBIE shall retain a right of
reimbursement for sixty percent (60%) of the contribution
(representing the excess contribution) directly from the net sale
proceeds of the property.

In either of the foregoing examples,

any equity or net sales proceeds remaining after reimbursement
pursuant to Civil Code, §4.800.2 shall be equally divided between
the parties.
4.

Except as

specifically

provided in this Agreement

executed by the parties hereafter, all real and personal property
acquired by either of the parties hereafter, except property
acquired in the name of both parties or where the parties have
made a writing as to the joint nature of such property or
purchased from the funds in their joint checking and/or savings
account(s) set forth in Paragraph R.5, below, shall be the
separate property of the party acquiring the property.

All real

and personal property in which title is taken in the name of HOPE
shall be the separate property of HOPE.

All real and personal

property in which title is taken in the name of ROBBIE shall be
the separate property of ROBBIE.

ROBBIE or HOPE may, from time

to time, sell and/or purchase with his or her separate property
additional real or personal property.

Said additional

investments shall remain the respective party's separate
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property.

ROBBIE and HOPE may, from time to time, sign loan

documents to enable the other to acquire property.

The fact that

either party signs the loan application thereon, and loans are
given based on same, will not alter title thereto and such
property shall be and remain the separate property of the title
holder.

ROBBIE and HOPE shall indemnify and hold each other

harmless from any liability assessed against either of them as a
result of his or her signing any such loan applications for the
other party's separate property acquisition.

Unless otherwise

agreed to in writing, or as provided in paragraph M.3. (regarding
joint purchase of residence and/or income property), if either
party makes payment on a mortgage or pays property taxes or makes
improvements to or repairs, using either community or separate
property, on any property for the other's benefit those funds
shall be transmuted and deemed to be 3 gift to the other party
and any right of reimbursement is waived so that the title to
said property shall control in determining the interest of ROBBIE
or HOPE in said property and the party making said payment shall
not be entitled to any reimbursement.
5.
any retirement

ROBBIE and HOPE agree that any contributions to
plan,

pension

plan,

profit

sharing

plan,

KEOGH or

IRA made on behalf of HOPE after the date of marriage which are
attributable to services rendered by HOPE after the date of
marriage shall remain the separate property of HOPE, and, except
as otherwise provided herein, shall be subject to HOPE'S
AGRFH01.LEV
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disposition in the same manner as though the proposed marriage
never had been entered into.
ROBBIE acknowledges and agrees that he shall have
no right, title or interest in and to any portion of HOPE'S
pension plan.
Pursuant to the terms of any such pension plan
and/or as a matter of federal law, ROBBIE has been advised and
understands that he may be entitled to survivor benefits under
any such pension plan of HOPE and ROBBIE hereby waives all of his
respective rights under any such pension plan and acknowledges
that the effect of such waiver will be to deprive him of any and
all such survivor benefits.

ROBBIE agrees that, immediately

after marriage, he will execute all forms required to effectuate
the waiver of his rights to survivor benefits under any such
pension plan of HOPE, including, without limitation, the Waiver
Election of the Qualified Pre-retirement Survivor Annuity With
Spousal Consent ("Waiver Form") which is attached hereto and
incorporated herein as Exhibit "E".

If HOPE dies prior to the

time when ROBBIE signs such forms, including the Waiver Form,
ROBBIE agrees to hold any funds received by him from any such
pension plan of HOPE as constructive trustee for the benefit of
HOPE f s otherwise designated beneficiaries or, if none, her
estate, and to immediately deliver any such funds to any such
beneficiaries of HOPE or her estate.
6.
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appreciation thereoh to any retirement plan, pension plan, profit
sharing plan, KEOGH or IRA made on behalf of ROBBIE after the
date of marriage which are attributable to services rendered by
ROBBIE after the date of marriage shall remain the separate
property of ROBBIE, and, except as otherwise provided herein,
shall be subject to ROBBIE'S disposition in the same manner as
though the proposed marriage never had been entered into.
HOPE acknowledges and agrees that she shall have
no right, title or interest in any portion of ROBBIE'S pension
plan(s).
Pursuant to the terms of any such pension plan
and/or as a matter of federal law, HOPE has been advised and
understands that she may be entitled to survivor benefits under
any such pension plan of ROBBIE, and HOPE hereby waives all of
her respective rights under any such pension plan and
acknowledges that the effect of such waiver will be to deprive
her of any and all such survivor benefits.

HOPE agrees that,

immediately after marriage, she will execute all forms required
to effectuate the waiver of her rights to survivor benefits under
any such pension plan of ROBBIE, including, without limitation,
the Waiver Election of the Qualified Pre-retirement Survivor
Annuity With Spousal Consent ("Waiver Form") which is attached
hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit "E". If ROBBIE dies
prior to the time when HOPE signs such forms, including the
Waiver Form, HOPE agrees to hold any funds received by her from
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any such pension plan of ROBBIE as constructive trustee for the
benefit of ROBBIE'S otherwise designated beneficiaries or, if
none, his estate, and to immediately deliver any such funds to
any such beneficiaries of ROBBIE or his estate.
N.

GIFTS
1.

HOPE and ROBBIE agree that all property received

by either party hereto by gift, bequest or devise shall remain
the separate property of the receiving party; provided, however,
that all wedding and anniversary gifts from third persons shall
be considered community property and each party is entitled to a
one-half (1/2) interest in said gifts.
2.

For an action, i.e., a payment, disbursement,

transfer, etc., to constitute a gift between the parties, it must
be accompanied by a writing which expressly declares that it is
made as a gift.

This provision does not apply to a gift between

the parties of any one item of clothing, wearing apparel or
jewelry with a market value of less than TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS
($10,000.00) or other tangible articles of a personal nature that
is used solely or principally by the party to whom the gift is
made.

(The placing by one party of title in the name of the

other party, as hereinbefore set forth, shall constitute a
sufficient writing to establish a gift under this section.)
O.

TAXES
1.

ROBBIE and HOPE agree that ROBBIE shall have the

option of whether or not to file joint federal or state income
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tax returns with HOPE for any and all tax years, so long as the
parties are married.

The election, if any, by ROBBIE, after the

parties' marriage, to file a federal or state income tax return
or a joint return, rather than a separate return, shall not
constitute a creation of any community property or of any other
rights or interests in contravention of this Agreement.
2.

If ROBBIE and HOPE file joint returns, the parties

agree that the tax liability of each party on any such returns,
to be paid from his or her separate property, shall be allocated
in the proportion that the tax liability of each party bears to
the aggregate tax liability of both parties, such proportion to
be determined based on a calculation of the single status tax
liability of each.

For example, if ROBBIE had filed a tax return

as a single individual and his tax liability would have been
TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($25,000.00), and HOPE's tax return
filed as a single individual would have had a liability of FOUR
THOUSAND DOLLARS ($4,000.00), HOPE shall pay four twenty-ninths
(4/29ths) of the total tax liability on such returns, and ROBBIE
shall pay twenty-five twenty-ninths (25/29ths) of the total tax
liability on such returns.

(In no event will HOPE f s obligation

to contribute to the tax liability exceed her tax liability if
she had filed separately from ROBBIE.)
In the event ROBBIE elects for ROBBIE and HOPE to
file separate returns, ROBBIE agrees that he will be responsible
for any tax incurred by either party on their separate returns
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and, in this regard, ROBBIE shall be entitled to use, for the
payment of such tax liability, any withholding made on behalf of
each of the parties.
3.

The parties agree that ROBBIE shall be solely

responsible for the costs, if any, of preparing the joint
returns.
:

4.

ROBBIE hereby indemnifies and agrees to hold HOPE

harmless from any and all claims, assessments, deficiencies,
interest, penalties and fees and costs attributable to his income
arising out of any federal or state income tax return heretofore
or hereafter signed and filed by ROBBIE and HOPE jointly or
ROBBIE solely.

HOPE hereby indemnifies and agrees to hold ROBBIE

harmless from any and all claims, assessment, deficiencies,
interest, penalties and fees and costs attributable to her income
arising out of any federal or state income tax return heretofore
or hereafter signed and filed by ROBBIE and HOPE jointly or HOPE
solely.
5.

ROBBIE agrees to report his income for the

purposes of federal or state income tax returns, all income of
whatsoever nature received by him or accruing to him from
whatever source from the date of this Agreement and throughout
the marriage of ROBBIE and HOPE, and to indemnify and hold HOPE
harmless from any and all claims, assessments, deficiencies,
penalties and fees and costs arising out of his non-inclusion of
any such income or disallowance of any deduction,
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6,

HOPE agrees to report her income, as required by

law for the purposes of federal or state income tax returns, all
income of whatsoever nature received by her or accruing to her
from whatever source, from the date of this Agreement and
throughout the marriage of ROBBIE and HOPE, and to indemnify and
hold ROBBIE harmless from any and all claims, assessments,
deficiencies, penalties and fees and costs arising out of her
non-inclusion of any such income or disallowance of any
deduction.
P.

LIFE INSURANCE
1.

HOPE shall have the right, at her own expense, to

obtain a policy of life insurance insuring the life of ROBBIE in
any amount that HOPE, at her sole discretion, elects.
own said policy as her sole and separate property.

HOPE shall

ROBBIE shall

cooperate in submitting to any physical examination, no more than
one (1) time per year, which is necessary to obtain and/or
maintain said life insurance policy.

HOPE waives the right to

seek from ROBBIE any reimbursement for any payments made on the
life insurance policy.
2.

ROBBIE shall have the right, at his own expense,

to obtain a policy of life insurance insuring the life of HOPE in
any amount that ROBBIE, at his sole discretion, elects.

ROBBIE

shall own said policy as his sole and separate property.

HOPE

shall cooperate in submitting to any physical examination, no
more than one (1) time per year, which is necessary to obtain
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and/or maintain said life insurance policy.

ROBBIE waives the

right to seek from HOPE any reimbursement for any payments made
on the life insurance policy.
3.

In the unlikely event of a dissolution of marriage

between the parties, the parties agree that each shall have the
right to receive and have transferred to them the policy or
policies insuring their life and, in the event a party chooses to
exercise their right to cause the other party to transfer such a
policy to them, the party then receiving the policy shall pay to
the other party the cash surrender value, if any, of said policy
forthwith.
4.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, ROBBIE shall

acquire and maintain insurance on his life naming HOPE as the
beneficiary, so long as the parties are married and living
together, in an amount no less than $250,000.00 face value, free
of any obligation.

Within ninety (90) days of the execution of

this Agreement, ROBBIE shall deliver to HOPE satisfactory proof
that the policy or policies have been obtained, the amount of
coverage and that the beneficiary designation is properly
endorsed on the policy or policies.
to cancel and/or

In the event ROBBIE elects

change said life insurance carrier and/or the

beneficiary designation thereon, ROBBIE shall notify HOPE at
least thirty (30) days prior to any such cancellation and/or
change.

Additionally, ROBBIE shall instruct the insurance

carrier, in writing, that the carrier is to provide notice to
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HOPE of ROBBIE'S intent to cancel and/or change said life
insurance carrier and/or beneficiary at least fifteen (15) days
before any such cancellation and/or change is instituted.

ROBBIE

acknowledges and agrees that in the event the insurance policy or
policies referenced hereinabove in this Paragraph P. 4.

are not in

effect at the time of ROBBIE'S death, his estate or successors
are responsible for providing identical benefits to HOPE.
5.

In the unlikely event of a dissolution of marriage

between the parties, ROBBIE'S obligation to maintain said life
insurance referenced in Paragraph P.4. for HOPE'S benefit shall
terminate and ROBBIE shall own said policy as his sole and
separate property, and shall have the absolute right to designate
any third person(s) as beneficiary, unless a court determines
otherwise as security for spousal support.
Q.

FURNITURE AND FURNISHINGS
1.

All furniture and furnishings, antiques and works

of art owned by ROBBIE prior to the date of marriage shall remain
the separate property of ROBBIE.

All furniture and furnishings,

antiques and works of art owned by HOPE prior to the date of
marriage shall remain the separate property of HOPE.

All

furniture and furnishings, antiques and works of art acquired
during the time of marriage with ROBBIE'S separate property or as
a gift shall be the separate property of ROBBIE.

All furniture

and furnishings, antiques and works of art acquired during the
time of marriage with HOPE ! s separate property or as a gift shall
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be the separate property of HOPE.

All furniture and furnishings,

antiques and works of art acquired jointly during the time of
marriage shall be owned by ROBBIE and HOPE as tenants-in-common
or joint tenants or community property as the parties may decide,
each party holding an undivided one-half (1/2) interest.

(Said

acquisition is defined as a purchase where title is taken in both
parties' names or where the parties make a writing as to the
nature of such acquisition.)
2.

In the event the funds of either party or the

joint funds of the parties are used to recover, re-upholster,
and/or repair the separate property furniture and furnishings,
antiques or works of art of the other, such payment and/or
disbursement shall be deemed to be a gift to said party with
there being no right of reimbursement in regard to same nor any
interest in said item of furniture and furnishings, antiques or
works of art unless otherwise agreed in writing.
3.

In the unlikely event of a dissolution of marriage

between the parties, HOPE will receive any furniture and
furnishings, antiques, and works of art which are her separate
property, and ROBBIE will receive any that are his separate
property.

As to any joint acquisitions of furniture and

furnishings, antiques and works of art, if the parties are unable
to agree on a division thereof, same shall be divided by
alternative selection, based upon a jointly appraised value, with
the party winning the flip of a coin making the first selection.
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In the event any items remain which are not divided between the
parties, same shall be contributed to a charity to be mutually
chosen by the parties with the parties to each receive one-half
(1/2) of the charitable deduction.
R.

SEPARATE AND COMMUNITY OBLIGATIONS
1.

All obligations secured by, or incurred for the

purchase of, real and/or personal property set forth in Exhibit
»Alf shall remain the separate obligations of ROBBIE.

ROBBIE

warrants and represents that he does not have an interest in any
real or personal property other than as set forth in Exhibit f,A".
If it shall hereafter be determined that ROBBIE has an interest
in any real and/or personal property other than as set forth in
Exhibit "A", that was acquired prior to the execution of this
Agreement, all obligations secured by or incurred for the
purchase of such real and/or personal property shall remain the
separate obligations of ROBBIE.

HOPE shall not be liable for any

of those obligations, and ROBBIE shall indemnify and hold HOPE
harmless from any claims thereon by any creditors of ROBBIE, and
from all fees and expenses that might be incurred in connection
therewith.
2.

kll obligations secured ^>7/

OT

iTicxurxed iox \-Yie

purchase of, real and/or personal property set forth in Exhibit
»B"

shall remain the separate obligations of HOPE.

HOPE warrants

and represents that she does not have an interest in any real or
personal property other than as set forth in Exhibit
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B .

If it

shall hereafter be determined that HOPE has an interest in any
real and/or personal property other than as set forth in Exhibit
"B",

that was acquired prior to the execution of this Agreement,

all obligations secured by or incurred for the purchase of such
real and/or personal property shall remain the separate
obligations of HOPE.

ROBBIE shall not be liable for any of those

obligations, and HOPE shall indemnify and hold ROBBIE harmless
from any claims thereon by any creditors of HOPE, and from all
fees and expenses that might be incurred in connection therewith.
3.

All obligations set forth in Exhibit "C" of the

Agreement, including, without limitations, any income tax
obligations for any year prior to the year of marriage, shall
remain the separate obligations of ROBBIE.

ROBBIE warrants and

represents that he does not have any obligations for which he is
liable other than as set forth in Exhibit "C".

If it shall

hereafter be determined that ROBBIE has any obligations for which
he is liable other than as set forth in Exhibit "C", all such
obligations shall remain the separate obligations of ROBBIE.
HOPE shall not be liable for those obligations, and ROBBIE shall
indemnify HOPE from them and from all fees and expenses that
might be incurred in connection therewith.
4.

All obligations set forth in Exhibit "D" of the

Agreement, including, without limitation, any income tax
obligations for any year prior to the year of marriage, shall
remain the separate obligations of HOPE.
AGRFI101.LEV

36

HOPE warrants and

represents that she does not have any obligations for which she
is liable other than as set forth in Exhibit "D".

If it shall

hereafter be determined that HOPE has any obligations for which
she is liable other than as set forth in Exhibit "D", all such
obligations shall remain the separate obligations of HOPE.
ROBBIE shall not be liable for those obligations, and HOPE shall
indemnify ROBBIE from them and from all fees and expenses that
might be Incurred in connection therewith.
5.

Notwithstanding anything stated to the contrary

above and below in this Agreement or any other written Agreement
executed by the parties hereafter, so long as the parties are
married and living together, the parties shall maintain a joint
checking and/or savings account (held in joint tenancy with right
of survivorship) into which both parties shall make contributions
from his or her community earnings (as defined in Paragraph F.
hereinabove) and from his or her separate property, as the
parties may agree, to meet the living expenses of the parties.
Such funds additionally may be used to make joint purchases or
for such other purposes as the parties may from time to time
agree.

The parties may also maintain one or more joint credit

cards, which credit card charges shall be used solely for joint
living expenses, which shall be paid from the joint checking
and/or savings account.
6.

As used herein the term "living expenses11

includes, but is not limited to, the monthly payments on the
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residence in which the parties are residing together (including
principal, interest, taxes, upkeep and maintenance and
association fees, if any), food, household supplies, housekeeper,
utilities, including water, gas, electricity, cable, and
telephone, laundry and cleaning, homeowner's insurance, personal
upkeep, medical insurance, accident and auto insurance, gasoline,
oil and auto repairs, joint vacation, joint entertainment
expenses, and joint gifts, and other such expenses as the parties
mutually agree upon in writing.
7.

Any and all monies, whether from each parties1

separate funds, or from the parties1 joint funds, or community
earnings (defined in Paragraph F. hereinabove), including, but
without limitation to, monies from the parties1 joint checking
account and/or savings account as set forth in Paragraph R.5.
hereinabove, used to maintain, improve or otherwise enhance
either parties1 separate property shall create no joint interest
in said separate property unless the parties specifically
otherwise agree in writing.

The parties hereby waive any and all

right to reimbursement of any kind of their separate or joint
funds from any source, and any expenses of maintenance,
improvement or enhancement of the other partyfs separate property
paid from any source including, but not limited to funds from the
parties1 joint checking and/or savings account as set forth in
Paragraph R.5.

Any and all such monies used to maintain,

improve or enhance either party's separate property is deemed to
AGRFI101.LEV
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be a gift to that party.

Additionally, any and all monies,

whether from each party's separate funds or from the parties'
joint funds (or from community property as defined in Paragraph
F. hereinabove), used to maintain, improve, or otherwise enhance
the parties 1 community property is deemed to be a gift to the
community property and the party contributing same hereby waives
any and all right to reimbursement of any kind of their separate
or joint funds and such maintenance, except as set forth in
Paragraph M.3. hereinabove regarding joint purchase of a
residence or income property.
S.

EXECUTION OF OTHER INSTRUMENTS
1.

Each party agrees that he or she shall, at the

request of the other, take all steps, and execute, acknowledge
and deliver to the other party all further instruments, necessary
or expedient to effectuate the purposes and intent of this
Agreement and shall do so in timely fashion when requested.
2.

Notwithstanding the failure of either party to

execute any such instrument, this Agreement shall be in all
respects operative as though said instruments were signed.
3.

HOPE further agrees to execute, acknowledge and

deliver to ROBBIE quitclaim deeds on all real property purchased
by ROBBIE from his separate property.

ROBBIE agrees to execute,

acknowledge and deliver to HOPE quitclaim deeds on all real
property purchased by HOPE from her separate property.
///
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T.

PARTIES BOUND
This Agreement shall be binding upon the parties hereto

and their respective heirs, executors, assigns, trustees,
administrators, successors and personal representatives.
U.

SPOUSAL SUPPORT AGREEMENT
This Agreement covers only property rights and

intentionally does not address spousal support issues.

The

issues of spousal support are not waived by either party and
shall be reserved to the jurisdiction of the court or written
agreement of the parties.
ROBBIE acknowledges that, in the event the parties
eliminate spending any extended time in Southern California and
reside in a rural area, if HOPE is still pursuing her acting
and/or modeling career, she will potentially be unable to
continue pursuing same under the new circumstances and, in the
unlikely event the parties terminate their relationship, the
court may take this into consideration regarding any support
issue, notwithstanding the fact that this conceivable could be a
marriage of short duration.
V.

GENERAL RELEASE
By this Agreement, ROBBIE and HOPE intend to define all

rights and obligations between them.

Except as otherwise

expressly provided in this Agreement, each of them releases the
other from all debts, liabilities and obligations of every kind,
previously incurred, including both personal obligations and
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encumbrances on the other party's separate property.
Except for the claims, demands and rights in this
Agreement created or reserved against either of the parties
hereto, which claim, demands and rights are expressly reserved
from the operation of this paragraph, each of the parties hereto,
for himself and herself and their respective heirs, executors,
administrators and assigns, hereby releases and discharges the
other party and his or her respective heirs, executors,
administrators and assigns, of and from any and all past claims
and demands of every kind, nature and description.
Each of the parties hereto does hereby waive with
respect to the other the provisions of Section 1542 of the Civil
Code of the State of California relating to claims affected by a
general release, which provides as follows:
,f

A general release does not extend to claims

which the creditor does not know or suspect
to exist in his favor at the time of
executing the release, which if known by him
must have materially affected his settlement
with the debtor.",
and, except as aforesaid, this Agreement is intended to and does
release all claims, which either of the parties may have against
the other.
W.

ENTIRE AGREEMENT; MODIFICATION
1.
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and agreement of the parties, and there have been no promises,
representations, agreements, warranties, or undertakings by
either party or to the other, either oral or written, of any
character or nature, except as set forth herein.

This Agreement

may be altered, amended, or modified only by an instrument in
writing, executed and acknowledged by the parties to this
Agreement, and by no other means.
2.

The parties agree that they occasionally may use

such expressions as "our property", "our house" or "our bank
account" when referring to property that is, by the terms of this
Agreement, separate property.

The parties further agree that

they sometimes may commingle separate property and/or property
that would otherwise be community property but for this
Agreement, or may make statements or take actions that are or
appear to be inconsistent with the terms of this Agreement.
Notwithstanding any of the above, the parties agree that this
Agreement may be altered, amended, or modified only as set forth
in Paragraph W.I., above.
X.

APPLICABLE LAW
This Agreement is executed in the State of California

and shall be subject to and interpreted under the laws of the
State of California.

Although this Agreement is executed in the

State of California and it makes reference to separate, community
and quasi-community property, the parties agree that it is their
intent that this Agreement shall cover all rights of property,

AGRFI1Q1.LEV

42

whether the property is situated within or without the State of
California, or within or without the United States of America.
Y.

SEVERABILITY
Every provision of this Agreement is intended to be

severable.

In the event any terms, provision, covenant, or

condition of this Agreement is declared to be illegal or invalid
for any reason whatsoever by a court of competent jurisdiction,
such illegality or invalidity shall not affect the other terms
and provisions hereof, which shall remain binding and
enforceable.
Z.

ATTORNEYS' FEES
In the event of a dispute between the parties arising

out of the terms, conditions and obligations imposed by this
Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover
reasonable attorneys1 fees, costs and expenses incurred in
connection therewith.

This provision shall not constitute a

waiver by either party of attorneys' fees and costs which may be
awarded by the Court relative to issues of spousal support, child
support, modifications and/or enforcement thereof pursuant to the
Family Law Act (California Civil Code, §4000 et seq.).
AA.

WAIVER
No waiver of any of the provisions of this Agreement

shall be deemed, or shall constitute, a waiver of any other
provision, whether or not similar, nor shall any waiver
constitute a continuing waiver.

AGRFI101.LEV

No waiver shall be binding

43

unless executed in writing by the party making the waiver.
AB.

ATTORNEY'S CERTIFICATE
The parties and their counsel agree that the execution

of the Attorney's Certificate by the attorney on behalf of either
of the parties shall not constitute a waiver of the
attorney/client privilege between the attorney and the party they
represent.
AC

CAPTIONS
The captions of the various paragraphs in this

Agreement are for the convenience of the parties only, and none
of them are intended to be any part of the text of this
Agreement, nor intended to be referred to in construing any of
the provisions hereof.
AD.

EXECUTION IN COUNTERPARTS
This Agreement may be executed in counterparts, each of

which shall be deemed to be an original and all such counterparts
shall together constitute one and the same instrument.
AE.

DRAFTING OF AGREEMENT
HOPE and ROBBIE both acknowledge and agree that both

parties actively participated in the negotiation and drafting of
this Agreement, and should any ambiguities exist in this
Agreement, same shall not be construed against the one drafting
this Agreement.
AF.

EFFECTIVE DATE
This Agreement shall be effective as of the date
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hereinbefore set forth.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this
Agreement on the date hereinafter sej^fbrth.

?V^?/

Dated

Dated

,AyKfrl~^, r9?f

"ZZTTANO/
OPE'MARIE RIZZITAN

APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT:
/

1

SIMKE, CHODOS, SILBERFBLp &
ANTEAU, INC.

Ronald W. Anteau,
Attorneys for ROBERT LEVIN
FLYNN, KN

LER

By.
)nnolly Oyler,
Attorneys for HOPE MARIE RIZZITANO
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CJ^\

ATTORNEY'S CERTIFICATE
The undersigned hereby certifies that he is an Attorney at
Law duly licensed and admitted to the practice of law in the
State of California; that he has been employed by HOPE MARIE
RIZZITANO, one of the parties to the foregoing Agreement; that he
has advised and consulted with HOPE MARIE RIZZITANO with respect
to her and ROBERT LEVIN f s rights and has fully explained to her
the legal significance under California law the foregoing
agreement, and the effect which it has upon her rights; that HOPE
MARIE RIZZITANO, after having been so advised by the undersigned,
acknowledged to the undersigned that she understood fully the
terms of the foregoing Agreement and the legal effect thereof
within the State of California, and that she executed the same
freely and voluntarily; and that the undersigned has no reason to
believe that HOPE MARIE RIZZITANO did not understand fully such
terms and effects, or that she did not freely and voluntarily
execute said Agreement, such execution being in the undersigned's
presence.

Dated

\7^/^>
,
/ V

l*^

. 1991

FLYNN, KNERR & OYLER

Connrilly/Oyler
Attorneys for
HOPE MARIE RIZZITANO
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ATTORNEY'S CERTIFICATE
The undersigned hereby certifies that he is an Attorney at
Law duly licensed and admitted to the practice of law in the
State of California; that he has been employed by ROBERT LEVIN,
one of the parties to the foregoing Agreement; that he has
advised and consulted with ROBERT LEVIN with respect to his and
HOPE MARIE RIZZITANO's rights and has fully explained to him the
legal significance under California law the foregoing Agreement,
and the effect which it has upon his rights; that ROBERT LEVIN,
after having been so advised by the undersigned, acknowledged to
the undersigned that he understood fully the terms of the
foregoing Agreement and the legal effect thereof within the State
of California, and that he executed the same freely and
voluntarily; and that the undersigned has no reason to believe
that ROBERT LEVIN did not understand fully such terms and
effects, or that he did not freely and voluntarily execute said
Agreement, such execution being in the undersigned's presence.

DATED

SIMKE ,/CHODOS , SILBERFE
ANTEAU, INC.

1991

Ronald W. Anteau
Attorneys for ROBERT LEVIN
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STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SS.
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
On this ifE^day of N^^^z^L±^
Tf 1991, before me the
undersigned, a Notary Public in and for said County and State,
residing herein duly commissioned and sworn, personally appeared
HOPE MARIE RIZZITANO, known to me (or proven to me on the basis
of satisfactory evidence) to be the person whose name is
subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledge to me that
she executed the same.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal the
day and year in this certificate first above written.

*-^2<~?\
OFFICIAL NOTARY SEAL
SANDRA L BANKS
notary Public—California
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
My Comm. Expire JUN 23,1^5
-c^-sr^Hf

n

,»^

<&-*-*^r>

/ Notary Public in and for the
County of Los Angeles, State
of California

Ill 19
M vII •»"*>"
I""'
ip n» m m ' »• n> *j

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SSCOUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

)

On this /grrH day of <O0r£(AB&P-~ , 1991, before me the
undersigned, a Notary Public in and for said County and State,
residing herein duly commissioned and sworn, personally appeared
ROBERT LEVIN, known to me (or proven to me on the basis of
satisfactory evidence) to be the person whose name is subscribed
to the within instrument, and acknowledge to me that he executed
the same.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal the
day and year in this certificate first above written.

'asUjUuu+^&Jj
OtfA^TKA.
Notary Public in and for the
County of Los Angeles, State
of California
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EXHIBIT "A"
SEPARATE PROPERTY OF ROBERT LEVIN

Stocks and Bonds

$ 6,000,000

Pension, 401K, IRA,

280,000

Profit Sharing, etc.
Real Estate

1,300,000

Loans Receivable
and Trust Deeds
Furniture, Furnishings, Electronics,
and Artwork (at cost)

2,100,000
180,000

Motor Vehicles

71,000

Musical Instruments

28,000

Gun Collection

20,000

Jewelry

22,000

Coin Collection
2,500 Gold Coins
800 Silver Coins

Value Not
Determined

TOTAL
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EXHIBIT " B "
SEPARATE PROPERTY OF HOPE MARIE RIZZITANO
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EXHIBIT "C"
DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF ROBERT LEVIN

None.
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EXHIBIT "D"
DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF HOPE MARIE RIZZITANO
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WAIVER ELECTION OF THE QUALIFIED PRERETIREMENT SURVIVOR
ANNUITY WITH SPOUSAL CONSENT
"
(Name of Company)

(H Company*)
—
("Plan")

(Name of Plan)
THIS WAIVER ELECTION AND SPOUSAL CONSENT FORM AFFECTS
VALUABLE RIGHTS TO DEATH BENEFITS UNDER THE PLAN, AND THE COMPANY
ENCOURAGES YOU AND YOUR SPOUSE TO SEEK THE ADVICE OF YOUR LAWYER,
ESTATE PLANNER OR OTHER TAX ADVISOR BEFORE SIGNING.
WAIVER ELECTION
I am i Participant in the Plan. I have read the EXPLANATION
OF THE aUATJPIED PRERETIREMENT SURVIVOR ANNUITY. I understand
that; (1) if I die before I retire and I have been married for at
least one year, any death benefit under the Plan will be paid to
my spouse in a monthly pension annuity for the life of my spouse
(a "spousal annuity") unless my spouse and I sign this Waiver
Election and Consent; (2) I have the right to waive (give up) the
spousal annuity, but only if my spouse consents to the waiver;
and (3) if my spouse consents to the waiver, I have the right to
(i) choose a beneficiary other than my spouse to receive any
death benefit from the Plan; (ii) specify a form of pension
benefit payment other than a survivor annuity; and (iii) cancel
any waiver at any time during my life without my spouse's
consent.

Please check one box below. If you do not check a
box, this Waiver Election is void and any death benefits will be paid to your spouse in the form
of a Qualified Preretirement Survivor Annuity.

[Check Box A if you want your spouse to receive any death benefit
but you want the benefits to be paid in a form other than a
spousal annuity. Your spouse must check Box 1 of the Spousal
Consent.J
f 1 A.
I waive (give up) the payment of a survivor annuity to
my spouse and request that any death benefits payable on my death
be paid to my spouse in the form stated in the most recent
Beneficiary Designation on file with the Plan.

EXHIBIT "E

-1-

heneficiary o t h e r than your
[Check Box B i f you want to n ^
b e n e f i c i a r y in
c h i n g e the
spouse now but you w i l l not be
, consent — t h i s i s
ou
the future without getting y o ^ «P °
^ m i i g f ^ h G c k B o x 2_
called a S p e c i f i c Waiver Election. I£_ R n y ^ Q £ t £ ^ j T I l I t I o n
of the Spousal C o n s g n t a n j ^ ^ i a ^ — ^ ^
Tor P a r t i c i p a t l o n ^ H l J ^ n e i ^ i a r y _ D e g ^
s *.ua navment of a Qualified
- ] B.
I waive {give A up)
^ ^ " J ^ ^ u s a if I ^
before I
Preretirement-siXrvivor n f ^ y _ f b S n e f i t s to the persons named in
r e t i r e and r e q u e s t P ^ " ™ Designation on f i l e with the Plan.
the most r e c e n t Beneficiary ue* y
««* a beneficiaryy o t h e r than your
[Check Box C i f you want to name a ben
t h e b e n e f i c i a r y a t any
spouse and a l s o want to ^ able eto cna g
ln
fche
fu
time without g e t t i n g your » P ° £ E J e £ J o n .
y|ur_sp_ous^jmis^^ck
t h i s i s c a l l e d a General Waiver *
Box 3 of tb* gpr,»flal Consent.]
. i-v,-. rvwment of a Qualified Pre~ ] C.
I waive (give up) the P « Y ^ J e i f j U d i e b e f o r e I r e t i r e
retirement S^vT^or Annuity to my v^ ^ ^ i f t t h e m o f i t r e c e n t
and request payment of my beneri
plan>
Beneficiary Designation on f i l e wi^
Executed t h i s

of

Signature of P a r t i c i p a n t

Name o t P a r t i c i p a n t

-2-

(Please *nm:7

SPOUSAL CONSENT
* ^u 1 J e c l a r e under penalty of perjury that (1) i am the spouse
c the Participant making the Waiver Election above; (2) I am not
acting under duress or undue influence; and (3) I have read and
understand my right to survivor benefits under the Plan as stated
in the attached "Explanation of the Qualified Preretirement
Survivor Annuity."
Please check the appropriate box below, if y OU do
not check a box or if you check the wrong box, this
Spousal Consent is void and any death benefits will
be paid to you in the form of a Qualitied Prera'Efr'emenr survivor Annuity.
"
(Check Box 1 if your spouse checked Box A of the Waiver
Election.]
i—rJ a : . Spousal Consent to Form of Benefit. I understand that
reaerai law gives me the automatic right to receive survivor
benefits from the Plan if any death benefits are due upon my
spouse's death. I a l a o understand that if I consent to this
Ufiri?*
£ i o n ' I am ? i v i n 9 U P ™Y r i 9 h t to receive the survivor
benefits under the Plan in a monthly survivor annuity which
federal law would give to me automatically, andl consent to
tnis. I also understand that (1) the effect of this Waiver"
9
H £e P I xan
* U tto b<s
u° C d ?f e my r i g h t t o m y spouse's death benefits under
,
^ .
Paid to me in a way which may not provide me with
my s p o u 3 e
C
0
the
S t o f ray l i f e ; l2)
in 5??,ih J<
n*y change the way
ia o r ^
i"^,?
> r death benefits may be paid to me at any time
without consulting me; and (3) I cannot cancel my consent.
[Check 3ox 2 if your spouse checked Box B of the Waiver
Election.]
Jr-,3,,2.', Spousal Consent to Specific Waiver ElecMnn
i understand that federal law gives me the automatic right to receive
survivor benefits from the Plan if any death benefits are due
J E l X ? U SE l?e cVt le a t h ' J a l S ° u n d e r s t a n d t h a * if I consent tomioit
V
°n> I am giving up my right to receive survivor
benefits from the Plan which federal law would give to me automatically and I consent to this. I also understand that (1) my
spouse has named another benericiary to receive any death
h f n f ^ f f f ? m u t h e P l a n flnd t h i £ C a u s e s m e t o l o e e valuable death
benefits which would have been paid to me and I also consent to
±515'' <2> my spouse may not change the desicmated beneficiary—
(3)
be Said JX ttnETt}^ s P ° " B e . m a y ^use the death benefits to
d e e a n a t e d b ne
cholsea In* ?°
?
f f* C l a r y fn *"* f o ™ that he or she
^hTfornT^ k
f° co?8gnt to this, (4) my 3 p o u s e m a y n o t c h
my cogent U n e t i t w i t h o u t mY consent; and (5) I cannot cancel

•1-

[Check Box 3 i f your spouse checked Box C of the Waiver
Election. ]

I underunderr—1 3
Snousal Consent «^_g»neral Waiver Election. I
i t ^ d ^ a ^ S S ^ y g i v e T S r t h e automatic fight ^o receive
survivor benefits fro, the Plan if any
^Tt^?consent^
3 S S Waiv^llectJon? I al g v i n g % my right to receive survivor
IZo^trlll^l^

£ ? f S ! ^

aTore

above* I also understand tnar K±> ^ * x r
n a l l . ^ i . r?^*h
clary other than me, this will cause me to lose J * ^ ^ * - * ,
benefits which would have been paid ^ine and I also consent to
this- (2) even if mv spouse namesroeas the beneficiary or m a or

e

iitTs.Uis.'cs ^r~pp ? S H 3 r

L

-7
_ ba
w paid
• Jto
a. me
~~ in
<*•,a way
* WAV
which
provide
me witn
Plan *
to
wmui
i also
jmay not
„*,*-+.
*.*
fVn>.
t^nd
*
r
f
.
i
_
x
.
,
*
.
£
„
1
,
'
f
A
and
I
consent
to
tms,
«ana
M
income for the rest of my nie, auu
_
(4) I cannot cancel my consent.
Signed this
day of
_
• 19_Signature of Participant's Spou se

Witnessed by;
Plan Representative
OR
STATE OF CALIFORNIA

)

COUNTY OF

)

) SS.

before me, the undersigned,
a Notary PuSlic in and ror-JaTd^titi, personally appeared
—
n 1
+.~w a ^v- Proved to me on the basis of satispersonally known to me °£provea w h o s e n a m e is subscribed to the
factory evidence to be the P««°
^
[ h e / s h e 3 executed the
within instrument and acxnowieuyeu
j,
same.
WITNESS my hand and official seal.

Notary Public in and far
9aid County and State
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EXPLANATION OF QUALIFIED PRERETIREMENT SURVIVOR ANNUITY
,

.("Company")
J"Plan")
(Name of

Plan)

Please read this explanation carefully!

If y o u

are marriedi

YOUR SPOUSE WILL AUTOMATICALLY RECEIVE ANY DEATH
BENEFIT FROM THE PLAN IN THE FORM OF A OUALTFTPD
PRERLTl^MENT . ^ R V I V Q R ANNUITY IF YOU "HAVE BEET?"
S»?£}E!?„!'^s A TY 0 ULEAST ONE YEAR ON YOUR DATE O F —
yjfil iY. ~^
CHOOSE ANOTHER FORM OF PAYMENT OF
TOIT^M^ITS
OR ANOTHER BENEFICIAL fly sifiWTM^ °
WAIVER ELECTION AND YOUR SPOUSE SIGNS A CONSENT

WHAT 15 THE QUALIFIED PRERETIREMENT SURVIVOR ANNUITY?
A Qualified Preretirement Survivor Annuity gives your sDouse a
inonthly pension^ payment for the rest of his or her i f f f T t you
die before retirement. The exact amount of the monthly pension
payment your spouse* will receive will depend on (1) the kind of
plan the Company has, (2) the earliest age at which you can
receive payment of benefits from the Plan; (3) the torn of
K n « 7 ™ °*nefit
P W w i t required by the Plan; and (4) your earned
pension or account balance at the time of your death'
p u r c h L ^ o ? J? * defined contribution plan (profit sharing, money
purchase or target benefit pension, or stock bonus) the nonthlv
pension payment will be the amount that can be nxirahsipri ^i+-h
your entire account balance at the time of your death?
rfceive^mnnJh?y d e feinnsei do nb 5f on erf i £he Preensstf oo fn hPi1*** 7°ur spouse will
ta H £ J!«J£?
P
*
* or her life equal
to the monthly retirement pension you would have received if Yvon
retired from the Company the day before your death?
Sn«^S a T. t ? P \? f * p l a n ' i f t h e 0 u a l i f i e d Preretirement Survivor
Annuity is worth $3,500.00 or lesa, then the Plan may simply oav
s ^ i l f b f p a i S l o ' !? ° n e i U m ?

SUm

*

-1-

BUt

^

death
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WHAT IS THE V7AIVER ELECTION?
** , or when you leave the Company if you are
When you become age 35 (or wne r * ^ }
(waive)
a give u?
under age 35 and have a vested bener1*1 , y
yy
the Qualified Preretirement Survivor A n n u . t y ^ x g ^
called a Waiver Election, m i s m w
j
(waive) the right:
(1) to have your death benefit paid to your spouse as a
survivor annuity, or
(2)

to have your spouse automatically named as your
beneficiary, or

(3)

to both (1) and (2).
, 4 „ve i ai+-v,pr or both of these r i g h t s , you may
If you give
up <«*i
> " " *any
* ° Lt Z^ °e bbefore
cancel
the Waiver
Election
e f o ^ yyour
^ ^death. ^This ^w i l l
reinstate the Q u a l ^ f / * *
* w ^ r Election. Your spouse must
spouse unless you «ign ? n ;w ff^ p u b l i c o r p l a n representative
consent in w r i t i n g . ^ j g r g ^ ^ f i E V - g g — - ^ e g n Q t n a v £ t o c o n 8 e n L
to your Waiver Election nur. v" ut VM_ i . ,,,
—
If you want to cancel y o x ~ w ^ v e r a u c t i o n .
i
, i \ +*»• oualified Preretirement Survivor
If you give up twelve) the
c o n Qe u «S J « ^
enefi.
Annuity
and your
spousespouse
f ^to l ^J ceei ivvee any
death
b neanmeef i &t^s b^from
ciary other
than your
any
ae
^
the Plan; and (2) specify a * « £ < * , B ^ U r surviving spouse or to
survivor annuity/ whether payaoie
*
another beneficiary.
If you are not married when y o u ^
^
^
^
f
^
"
payable under the Plan w i l l be pax^
y
^
^
d prior
But this may not be txae^tjwx^ou s n o
i i m n e d i a t e l v n o t i f y the
to your death. Therefore, n V
,
^
_, ,,U11
*—
Company of any eTSngel" y t t r rftAJ - Llal s t a t U 8 '
WHAT IS THE F ^ T OF A WAIVER ELECTION?

, • i 4-fca n u l l i f i e d Prftrfttirement Survivor
If you give UP (waive the P H ^ I f — ^ r E C e i v e a n y deltE—
Annuity and name a n o t n ? r r j g g | j _ ^ y
understand that your
^ S ^ t r n o t ^ a S ^ ^ ^ l a J a L ^ * " ^
^
death.
,-.
• ~„ *-rt vnur spouse the automatic r i g h t to
The federal law g i v e s to your spo
^ ^
u p Q n y o u r deafch>
receive payment of a death f
Q ^ ^ t a n d your rights
a J ^ o b i i g t S o n s co h ncer^ng1our dea?h benefit.
^ - - o m a M c r i s h ^ ^
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